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INTERSTATE BANKING AND PRODUCT LINE
EXPANSION: IMPLICATIONS FROM
AVAILABLE EVIDENCE
Stephen A. Rhoades*
I. INTRODUCTION
The financial sector of the economy has been the subject of impor-
tant changes in recent-years as a result of market forces, applications of
electronic technology and financial deregulation. Market forces, such as
high and variable interest rates, and applications of technology generally
are not directly susceptible to social control. Consequently, financial de-
regulation has received the most attention because it is the product of
conscious decisions by policymakers at both the federal and state levels.
Numerous proposals for deregulation have already been imple-
mented. For example, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 19801 and the Garn-St Germain Depository
Institutions Act of 19822 have broadened the asset and liability powers of
nonbank thrift institutions (savings and loan associations, mutual savings
banks and credit unions) and have mandated by 1986 the removal of
Regulation Q ceilings on the interest rates that commercial banks and
nonbank thrift institutions may pay on deposits.3 These are unquestion-
ably important elements of deregulation with interesting implications.
Nevertheless, this Article will focus on areas of deregulation that are still
being considered in policy circles; notably interstate banking and expan-
sion of product lines that commercial banks may offer.
Many of the arguments both for and against interstate banking and
product line expansion reflect vested interests and ideological views. For
example, large banking organizations, motivated by the prospect of finan-
cial benefits, are advocates of interstate banking and product line deregu-
* Financial Structure Section, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C. The views ex-
pressed herein are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board, its staff or
any of the people who provided comments. I extend thanks to Dean Amel, Matthew Gelfand,
Margaret Guerin-Calvert and Donald Savage for helpful comments and to Patricia Warren for
excellent typing.
1. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
2. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
3. 12 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (1982).
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lation. However, smaller banking organizations and firms participating
in markets that banks would like to enter, such as insurance and securi-
ties underwriting, feel threatened by the prospect of facing increased
competition from large banking organizations. Finally, there are others,
with no vested interest, who believe that government intervention in the
marketplace generally yields results that are inferior to those determined
by unencumbered markets. They advocate deregulation in general, in-
cluding that associated with existing constraints on interstate banking
and product line expansion.
The arguments of vested interest groups and those with a strong
ideological position may provide useful information and insight for
policymakers to consider in weighing the desirability of deregulation.
However, decisions made with respect to interstate banking and product
line expansion of banks will have fundamental implications for the finan-
cial sector generally, as well as the safety and soundness of the banking
system. Consequently, it is important that the interests of the public pre-
vail over the positions of vested interest groups and ideological factions.
This outcome is best ensured if the policymakers have relevant informa-
tion on which to rely in formulating decisions.
The purpose of this Article is to discuss some of the likely effects of
interstate banking and product line expansion by banking organizations
based on direct and indirect empirical evidence. This evidence demon-
strates that interstate banking would not appear to offer demonstrable
benefits in terms of increased operating efficiency, increased competition
or gains in allocative efficiency. However, interstate banking apparently
would not lead to significant adverse effects that could not be controlled
by the application of existing antitrust laws along with some additional
legislative constraints on mergers among the nation's largest banking or-
ganizations. Additionally, evidence indicates that small banks would re-
mhain viable in an era of deregulation, suggesting that there would not be
serious externalities resulting from widespread bank failures that might
jeopardize the safety and soundness of the banking system. Further-
more, economic theory suggests that freely functioning markets will yield
the most efficient allocation of resources, barring significant externalities
and market failure which do not appear likely with interstate banking.
Finally, in a system founded on the principle of private property, there
should be a strong justification for prohibiting the freedom of use of such
property. The evidence regarding the implications of interstate banking
does not appear to provide such justification. Under the circumstances,
interstate banking would appear to be in the public interest.
With respect to deregulation regarding product line, little systematic
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research exists on which to base a policy decision. However, recent
experience in banking and the ifidustrial sector raises serious questions
about the effect of product line expansion on commercial bank safety and
soundness and suggests that such deregulation may increase bank risk.
Because the externality of major bank failures is so far-reaching, uncer-
tainty as to the effects of product line expansion on bank risk creates a
very difficult policy issue.
II. INTERSTATE BANKING
Although interstate banking on a nationwide basis is prohibited in
the United States,4 numerous avenues have been exploited by banking
organizations to provide some bank-like services on an interstate basis.
For example, banking organizations have established loan production of-
fices, Edge Act offices and nonbank subsidiaries and have made interstate
acquisitions of failing thrifts under the Garn-St Germain Act of 1982.1
More recently and potentially more importantly, the Federal Reserve
Board, in 1984, approved the application of New York's Banker's Trust
to establish a "nonbank bank" in Florida. Subsequently, many firms
(banks as well as nonfinancial institutions such as Sears, Roebuck & Co.)
have joined Bankers' Trust in exploiting a loophole in the Bank Holding
Company Act and have filed applications to establish bank-like institu-
tions which do not meet the Act's definition of a bank and so are not
subject to its prohibition on interstate banking.6 By the end of 1984,
there were nearly 350 such applications, most of which were filed with
the Comptroller of the Currency. These events have made interstate
banking a pressing policy issue. Because interstate banking might dra-
matically alter the United States banking structure, many questions have
been raised regarding the implications of interstate banking.7
4. Federal laws, the McFadden Act of 1927, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982), and the Douglas
Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982), com-
bined with state laws restrict such activity.
5. For a discussion of these activities, see Special Issue: Interstate Banking, ECON. REv.,
May 1983 (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta) [hereinafter cited as Special Issue: Interstate
Banking].
6. According to the Bank Holding Company Act, an institution is defined as a bank if it
offers demand deposits and makes commercial loans. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982). By agreeing
not to offer one of these services, an institution is not a bank for purposes of the Act although
it has a bank charter and its deposits are federally insured. In view of this loophole, it is
notable that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in the "Beehive" case recently ruled against
the Federal Reserve Board's argument that NOW accounts are a demand deposit. First
Bancorp. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 728 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1984).
Presumably, a nonbank bank could offer NOW accounts and make commercial loans and not
be subject to the Bank Holding Company Act.
7. For studies dealing with some of these questions, see Rhoades, The Competitive Effects
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Four of the most important questions that emerge in connection
with the prospect of interstate banking are the implications for local mar-
ket banking concentration, nationwide banking concentration, the viabil-
ity of small banks and the allocation of credit. Concern about local
market concentration arises because changes in local market concentra-
tion affect competition in local markets and thus the cost and quality of
services available to consumers. Interest in nationwide banking concen-
tration stems partly from economic considerations and perhaps more im-
portantly from the possible sociopolitical effects of a substantial increase
in banking concentration. Questions about the viability of small banks
arise in large part out of a concern over the availability of credit to local
communities. Finally, it has been suggested that interstate banking will
have implications for the efficiency of credit allocation in the nation.
These four questions are addressed in the following sections of the
Article.
A. Local Banking Market Concentration
If interstate banking were to be permitted, there would undoubtedly
be an intensive drive, at least by larger banking organizations, to expand
geographically. As a result, large banking organizations could be ex-
pected to move into local banking markets throughout the country.8
Based on past experience, such expansion would generally take place by
acquisition. The prospect of such a development has raised questions
concerning the effect on concentration in local banking markets.
1. Issues raised by local market concentration
Concern over the likely consequence of interstate banking arises, to
a large extent, because competition, and thus the prices and quality of
services, is influenced by local market concentration. It should be noted
that the justification for this concern has been questioned on two
grounds. First, it has been argued that nonlocal providers of financial
services, such as money market mutual funds, provide an alternative to
banks as a source of financial services for locally limited customers (i.e.,
consumers and small businesses). However, in spite of the availability of
of Interstate Banking, 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 1 (1980); DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, GEo-
GRAPHIC RESTRICTIONS ON COMMERCIAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES (Jan. 1981);
Ginsburg, Interstate Banking, 9 HoFsTRA L. REv. 1133 (1981); Special Issue: Interstate Bank-
ing, supra note 5.
8. Past experience with expansion at the state level suggests that, in the early years of
interstate banking, expansion would generally be confined to large markets. In later years,
however, it is likely that smaller markets would be entered as opportunities in large markets
become exhausted.
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nonlocal financial services, evidence indicates that a large majority of av-
erage families, those with an income of $20,000 to $30,000 per year,9 and
small businesses still rely on local institutions for their financial serv-
ices.1" Consequently, the degree of competition in local markets remains
important.
The second basis for questioning the concern over local market con-
centration is exemplified in the work of Yale Brozen and Harold Dem-
setz.11 According to this view, the high profits usually observed in highly
concentrated markets (i.e. markets where the leading firms account for a
particularly high proportion of total market output) are not the result of
monopoly power but instead are the consequence of the relative efficiency
and skill of the firms that dominate these markets. Market concentration
increases because a few firms are more efficient and successful than
others. The relative profitability of these few efficient firms is responsible
for the overall market profitability.
While this view may be appropriate in some instances, there is insuf-
ficient evidence to accept it as the general explanation for the high profit-
9. Data from a 1983 survey indicate that about twenty-two percent of the families in this
income group use nonlocal banks or thrifts, but they do not use money market mutual funds.
Avery, Elliehausen, Canner & Gustafson, Survey of Consumer Finances, 1983, 70 Fed. Res.
Bull. 679 (1984). About fifteen percent of the families with incomes below $20,000 use nonlo-
cal banks or thrifts, but not money market funds. Id.
10. A survey of small businesses in April, 1982, by the National Federation of Independ-
ent Business revealed that a commercial bank was the most recent source of a small business
loan for ninety-one percent of the respondents. Another survey of small businesses, covering
the Sixth Federal Reserve District, found that in large or small cities, small businesses rely on
local commercial banks for checking accounts and loans. See Whitehead, The Sixth District
Survey of Small Business Credit, ECON. REv., Apr. 1982, at 42 (Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta). The importance of local banks to small businesses can also be inferred from surveys
in 1980 and 1982 by the National Federation of Independent Business which are reported in
Dunkelberg & Scott, Small Business Evaluates Its Banking Relationships, 166 BANKERS MAG.
40 (1983), and a 1981 survey of small banks by the three bank regulatory agencies reported in
TASK FORCE ON SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE, STUDIES OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE (Feb.
1982), summarized in Struck & Glassman, Commerical Banking and the Small Business Sec-
tor: Observations from a Survey, J. COM. BANK LENDING, Feb. 1983, at 21. Experience in
Houston shows that out-of-state banks have very few business customers with less than $100
million in sales and have virtually no business customers with less than $50 million in sales.
See Fowler, Money Center Giants Staking Out Houston Market, HOUSTON Bus. J., Nov. 26,
1984, at 1. See also PETER MERRILL ASSOCIATES, THE ENVIRONMENT OF NONLOCAL COM-
PETITION IN U.S. BANKING MARKETS (1981) (prepared for the American Bar Association); P.
WATRO, IS COMMERCIAL BANKING STILL A SEPARATE LINE OF COMMERCE? THE EvI-
DENCE FROM OHIO'S SMALL BUSINESS FIRMS (1981) (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland); J.
WOLKEN, GEOGRAPHIC MARKET DELINEATION: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE, Staff
Studies No. 140 (1984) (Federal Reserve Board).
11. See, e.g., Brozen, Concentration and Structural and Market Disequilibria, 16 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 241 (1971); Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1973).
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ability that is usually associated with high market concentration. The
fact remains that a very large number of empirical studies in both bank-
ing and the industrial sector have found evidence of a statistically signifi-
cant relationship between market concentration and profitability. 12 The
explanation provided in most of these studies for the high profits ob-
served in concentrated markets is monopoly power. Moreover, it is espe-
cially important to note that the monopoly power explanation for high
profits is neither arbitrary nor ideologically motivated. There is a
lengthy and detailed theoretical foundation for this explanation dating
back at least to Adam Smith. Most of the empirical studies of the rela-
tionship between market concentration and profitability tested hypothe-
ses that came directly from this body of theoretical work, particularly the
work of Chamberlin, Mason, and Robinson.13 These studies are not after
the fact attempts to explain the statistical results which emerged from the
studies, and should not casually be dismissed simply because some post
hoc story or explanation for the results can be constructed. 4 In any
event, the efficiency explanation for high profits in concentrated banking
markets is particularly unpersuasive because numerous statistical studies
concerning economies of scale in banking, which will be discussed later,
have found that scale economies are generally not important."5 This im-
12. For a review of these studies in connection with the industrial sector, see Weiss, The
Concentration-Profits Relationship and Antitrust, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE
NEW LEARNING 184, 201 (1974). For studies regarding the banking industry, see S.
RHOADES, STRUCTURE PERFORMANCE STUDIES IN BANKING: AN UPDATED SUMMARY
AND EVALUATION, Staff Studies No. 119 (1982) (Federal Reserve Board), summarized in 68
Fed. Res. Bull. 477 (1982); Heggestad, Market Structure, Competition, and Performance in
Financial Industries: A Survey of Banking Studies, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 449
(F. Edwards ed. 1979).
13. See E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1933); Mason,
Price and Production Policies of Large-Scale Enterprise, 29 AM. ECON. REv. 61 (1939); J.
ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1934).
14. Indeed, other explanations for the tendency of high market share firms to have high
profits can be offered which are consistent with the basic theoretical models. For example, one
recent study in banking found that banks with high market shares tend to be relatively profita-
ble, after controlling the effects of concentration. Because there are no significant efficiencies
associated with large size in banking, the study offered a plausible explanation for these find-
ings on the basis of work in psychology and the professed objectives of business executives.
Essentially, the study demonstrates that market leaders enjoy an inherent degree of monopoly
power because consumers are likely to have heard of such firms and will perceive them as
better because of their leading position. See Rhoades, Market Share As A Source of Market
Power, 35 1. ECON. & BUS. - (1985).
15. See infra notes 34-42 and accompanying text. In contrast to studies in the industrial
sector and in food retailing, which find that high concentration markets have substantially
higher profits or prices than low concentration markets, studies in banking generally find a
small, though statistically significant, difference in profits between high and low concentration
markets.
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plies that firms with the largest market shares do not generally exhibit
superior operating efficiency.
2. Evidence on local market concentration
In view of the considerations outlined above, there is ample reason
for weighing the likely effect of interstate banking on local market con-
centration. Data reveal that concentration in local banking markets
throughout the country has generally declined since 1966. For example,
the average change in local market concentration ratios between 1966
and 1981 was -10.7% and -7.7% in SMSAs and large nonSMSA counties
respectively.16 Similarly, the Herfindahl index, an alternative to the con-
centration ratio as a measure of market structure, declined, on average,
by 18.5% and 16.3% in SMSAs and nonSMSA counties respectively
during this same time period. The inclusion of data for thrift institutions
(savings and loans and mutual savings banks) along with that for com-
mercial banks in the construction of local market concentration ratios,
also produces for the period 1973 through 1981 a drop in the average
concentration ratio and Herfindahl index, although the decline would not
be as great.
The persistent decline in concentration of banking markets over the
past fifteen years provides little indication as to the effects of interstate
banking on local market concentration. However, a comparison of local
market concentration among the individual states is more meaningful.
This comparison is useful because states have different laws regarding the
permitted degree of geographic expansion. Some states permit full state-
wide branching while others allow unit banking or limited branching,
which is usually very restrictive. Moreover, some of the states that have
restrictive branching laws (unit banking or limited branching) have per-
mitted multibank holding companies (MBHCs), which in some states
have expanded statewide. Consequently, a comparison of local market
concentration among states allowing different degrees of geographic ex-
pansion should provide at least a rough indication of the likely effect of
interstate banking on local market concentration. This comparison is
presented in Appendix A.
Average three-firm deposit concentration ratios in 1982 for markets
(SMSAs and nonSMSA counties) in each state are presented in Appen-
dix A. The states are divided into the following five groups: (1) state-
wide branching states, (2) limited branching states in which at least fifty
16. Figures are calculated from Summary of Deposits files and are consolidated for bank
holding companies. The SMSA and nonSMSA counties have been widely used as approxima-
tions of local banking markets for research and policy purposes.
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percent of the state deposits are held by MBHCs, (3) limited branching
states in which less than fifty percent of state deposits are held by
MBHCs, (4) unit banking states in which at least fifty percent of deposits
are held by MBHCs, and (5) unit banking states in which less than fifty
percent of state deposits are accounted for by MBHCs.17 Appendix A
also lists, for each category, the average of the individual state average
market concentration ratios.
In general, the average market concentration data for the five
groups of states shown in Appendix A differ only negligibly.1 8 For exam-
ple, the average of SMSA concentration ratios in statewide branching
states (73.4%) is about the same as that in the other four groups of states
(72.8%, 70.1%, 71.9% and 56.0%). Also, the extent of MBHC activity
has no effect. The only exception arises in the most restrictive situa-
tion-the three states with unit banking laws in which MBHCs account
for less than fifty percent of state deposits, where the average SMSA con-
centration ratio is 56.0%. Data for the non-SMSA county markets fol-
low the same pattern without exception. Specifically, the average non-
SMSA county concentration ratios for the five groups of states are
87.7%, 86.4%, 88.7%, 93.3% and 84.5%. These data seem to indicate
that more or less restrictive laws on geographic expansion do not have a
substantial effect on concentration in local banking markets.
It seems fair to conclude that interstate banking by itself is not likely
to have much of an effect on concentration in local banking markets, and
thus competition is not likely to increase as a result of market structure
change. The reduction in barriers to entry, however, should at a mini-
mum increase the threat of entry into many markets. According to the
theory of potential competition, the increased threat should lead to more
competitive pricing behavior. If, of course, the antitrust laws were to be
enforced less restrictively with respect to horizontal mergers (those be-
tween firms in the same market), local market concentration could be
expected to increase.19 This probably would, however, occur with or
17. It would be logically reasonable to classify the states according to whether the state
law permits multibank holding companies rather than on the basis of the percentage of depos-
its held by such companies. However, the classification method used here was selected because
multibank holding companies have been permitted in some states where other means of expan-
sion are available and for this and other reasons have not expanded significantly in some states
which permit them. Yet, experience with interstate expansion opportunities to date suggests
that the geographic expansion opportunity would be rapidly exploited if interstate banking
were permitted.
18. The District of Columbia is treated as a state.
19. One recent study has illustrated that the Justice Department's 1982 horizontal merger
guidelines, if strictly applied, would not significantly restrict horizontal mergers in banking
today. See J. BURKE, ANTrTRUST LAWS, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES, AND THE
[Vol. 181122
without interstate banking.
B. Nationwide Banking Concentration
Legislation permitting interstate banking reasonably could be ex-
pected to result in interstate expansion primarily by very large banking
organizations. These organizations have the necessary resources and
perhaps the incentive to expand because expansion opportunities within
their home states may largely be exhausted. Experience at the state level
indicates that bank holding companies typically expand by merger or ac-
quisition rather than de novo. Furthermore, experience with interstate
banking in New England under the recently established regional inter-
state banking laws shows that the largest banks tend to expand interstate
and do so by the acquisition of other large organizations. For example,
Bank of Boston, the largest bank in the region, has attempted to acquire
one of the largest banks in each of the other New England states that is a
party to the agreement.
1. Issues raised by nationwide concentration
Casual observation and common sense at least suggest that inter-
state banking may lead to an increase in the nationwide concentration of
banking resources. Questions have been raised and concern has been ex-
pressed over the possibility of such a development. The source of this
concern is largely of a sociopolitical nature. Such a concern is no sur-
prise in a country which has exhibited a strong aversion to concentra-
tions of power of any kind. It simply reflects longstanding philosophical
and cultural views that have been manifested in many of our laws and
institutional relationships. For example, in the political arena, our three
branches of government were established with built-in checks and bal-
ances; the commander-in-chief of the armed forces is a civilian, and the
rights of the individual states vis-a-vis the federal government are still
vigorously maintained. In economic life, we have opted for a free market
system as opposed to a centrally controlled system. Both the first and
second banks of the United States were not rechartered primarily because
of concern with the concentration of financial power, and the first anti-
trust law (Sherman Act, 1890) was passed by Congress in part as a re-
sponse to the increasing concentration at that time of industrial
resources.
An increase in the concentration of economic power raises the con-
LIMITS OF CONCENTRATION IN LOCAL BANKING MARKETS, Staff Studies No. 138 (1984)
(Federal Reserve Board).
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cern that private businesses would have undue influence over political
decisions, cultural institutions and the educational establishment. Thus,
it is conceivable that if the concentration of private economic power pro-
ceeded far enough, the American people would demand that the govern-
ment bring this power under control.20 This would have fundamental
ramifications for the continued existence of our pluralistic society.2
While interest in the implications of interstate banking for nation-
wide banking concentration stems from sociopolitical considerations,
there are economic issues as well. One such concern is the possibility
that a number of large banks would account for a substantially greater
proportion of the banking system, creating the risk that the federal gov-
ernment would feel compelled to rescue them in the event they were in
financial difficulty. So long as it remains a fixture of public policy to
assure the stability of the banking system, an increasing concentration of
the nation's banking resources would inevitably raise this issue. This
would, of course, have significant implications for the structure of the
deposit insurance system. Although it would arise only in an extreme
case of banking concentration, there is the further possibility that credit
resources may largely be allocated by the managerial decisions of a few
firms rather than in response to the market conditions to which a larger
number of independent units must react.
Unlike the issues raised by local market concentration, those raised
by nationwide concentration are neither mathematically tractable nor
quantifiable. This, however, makes them no less real or important. Con-
sequently, in considering interstate banking as a public policy option, it is
important to determine what effect, if any, interstate banking might have
on nationwide banking concentration.
2. Evidence on nationwide concentration
Data on nationwide banking concentration indicates that there has
not been a significant trend in the concentration of domestic deposits
since 1960.22 This observation has been confirmed by two fairly recent
studies.23 Although a recent study found some indication that a small
20. While ownership through stock may remain fairly widespread, management control
and decision-making power would be more concentrated.
21. For a lengthy discussion of the issues regarding merger activity and the motivation of
business executives, see S. RHOADES, POWER, EMPIRE BUILDING, AND MERGERS (1983).
22. Inclusion of foreign deposits as well as domestic deposits reveals an increase in the
proportion of deposits held by the 100 largest banking organizations. This is due to the dra-
matic increase in international banking during the past twenty years involving only very large
banks.
23. See S. TALLY, THE IMPACT OF HOLDING COMPANY ACQUISITIONS ON AGGREGATE
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downward trend may have reversed, there is no evidence of a persistent
trend. 24 Domestic deposit data reveal that the 100 largest banking
organizations held 49.6%, 46.7% and 48.9% of total domestic commer-
cial bank deposits in 1968, 1978 and 1983 respectively.25
The data on trends in nationwide banking concentration may be in-
teresting and indicative of important changes occurring in the industry.
They are not, however, especially useful for speculating on the possible
effect of interstate banking on nationwide banking concentration. Data
on concentration of banking resources at the state level are more relevant
for that purpose. The reason, as noted earlier, is that some states have
permissive expansion laws and have experienced significant expansion
whereas others have not. This permits a comparison of the statewide
concentration in states that have experienced expansion or have liberal
expansion laws with the statewide concentration in other states. Differ-
ences observed among the states should be indicative of the directional
change in national banking concentration that might be expected if the
United States were to reduce or eliminate prohibitions on interstate
banking. However, these data are not useful for judging bank efficiency
in different states or for making broad judgments regarding the desirabil-
ity of one or another type of banking law.
Appendix B shows the percent of deposits held by the five largest
banking organizations in each state as of 1983. As in Appendix A, the
states are divided into five groups on the basis of the liberality of branch-
ing laws or the existing degree of geographic expansion. The groups are
those states with (1) statewide branching, (2) limited branching but at
least fifty percent of state deposits held by MBHCs, (3) limited branching
with less than fifty percent of state deposits held by MBHCs, (4) unit
banking with at least fifty percent of state deposits held by MBHCs, and
(5) unit banking with less than fifty percent of state deposits held by
MBHCs.
There are substantial differences in the statewide concentration ra-
tios between the various groups of states. The data show consistently
that in states where geographic expansion or the opportunity for geo-
graphic expansion is greatest, the statewide concentration ratio is rela-
tively high. For example, Appendix B shows that the twenty-five
CONCENTRATION IN BANKING, Staff Economic Studies No. 80 (1974) (Federal Reserve
Board), summarized in 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 79 (1974); Rhoades, Size and Rank Stability of the
100 Largest Commercial Banks, 1925-1978, 34 J. ECON. & BUS. 123 (1982). However, using
different data sources, these two studies produced findings showing small but opposite trends.
24. See Daskin, Aggregate Concentration and Geographic Diversification in U.S. Banking,
1978-1982, 37 L ECON. & Bus. - (1985).
25. Source: Federal Reserve Board.
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statewide branching states have an average five-firm deposit concentra-
tion ratio of 72.4%, ranging from 44.6% to 95.3%. States with limited
(and usually quite restrictive) branching laws, but in which MBHCs hold
at least half of state deposits, have an average concentration ratio of
51.0%. This compares with an average concentration ratio of only
25.8% for those limited branching states where MBHCs account for less
than half of state deposits. Data for the unit banking states reveal that
the states in which MBHCs control over half of the deposits have a con-
centration ratio of 49.0%, on average, while those unit banking states
where less than half of the deposits are controlled by MBHCs have an
average concentration ratio of 31.6%.
Based on relevant experience of the individual states and the experi-
ence with interstate banking in New England, noted earlier, it is likely
that interstate banking will lead to a significant increase in the concentra-
tion of banking resources at the national level. Three points regarding
this conclusion are warranted. First, since relevant evidence so strongly
supports the conclusion, it seems argumentative and unrealistic to sug-
gest otherwise. Good public policy requires that a move toward inter-
state banking should be made with as full an awareness of the
consequences as possible. Second, there appears to be little or no basis
for concluding that some increase in national banking concentration will
have demonstrable adverse economic effects. Third, it is not possible to
infer, from the experience of the states, the precise magnitude of the in-
crease in nationwide concentration that would result from interstate
banking, although it seems likely that the increase would not be trivial.
3. Additional considerations with nationwide concentration
Earlier it was concluded that interstate banking is not likely to have
a significant effect on local market concentration. Thus, there was little
reason to consider the possibility of developing interstate banking legisla-
tion to constrain local market concentration or, in the extreme, of scrap-
ping interstate banking as a policy initiative to avoid a potential increase
in local market concentration. In contrast, however, it seems quite clear
that interstate banking would be accompanied by an increase in the na-
tionwide concentration of banking resources.
a. limitations of the antitrust laws
It is a mistake to think that the antitrust laws would constrain the
tendency toward increased nationwide concentration, which would result
primarily from very large acquisitions and mergers. The reason is that
the "antimerger" antitrust law, section 7 of the Clayton Act as amended,
1126 [Vol. 18
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is intended to prohibit mergers "where in any line of commerce or in any
activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of
such acquisition . . . may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly."' 26 This law is primarily effective in prohibit-
ing horizontal mergers (mergers between competitors) when a merger is
likely to have anticompetitive effects. Moreover, the courts in the past
have adopted a strong stand against horizontal mergers under section 7
of the Clayton Act, as evidenced by a lower court decision in United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.27 and United States Supreme Court deci-
sions in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States28 and United States v. Philadel-
phia National Bank.29
Section 7 of the Clayton Act has proven effective in constraining
horizontal merger activity when adequately enforced. It has not, how-
ever, proven to be effective in constraining conglomerate and market ex-
tension mergers30 (those between firms operating in different product
and/or geographic markets).31 Since market extension mergers would be
typical in an era of interstate banking, the antitrust laws could not be
relied upon to prevent a very substantial increase in the nationwide con-
centration of banking resources. For example, it is likely that a merger
between BankAmerica and Citicorp would be acceptable under today's
antitrust laws.
It seems clear from the experience at the individual state level, along
with that of regional interstate banking in New England, that interstate
banking would lead to an increase in the nationwide concentration of
banking resources. It is also apparent that the antitrust laws would not
effectively limit such an increase. Furthermore, although financial limi-
tations, such as a limitation of capital, will slow the increase in concen-
26. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
27. 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
28. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
29. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
30. For a more thorough discussion of the limitations of the antitrust laws in this area, see
Rhoades, Antitrust Law Limitations and Market Extension Mergers, BANKERS MAG., May-
June 1982, at 98.
31. The ineffectiveness of the antitrust laws in constraining conglomerate and market ex-
tension mergers stems, in large part, from the limitation of basic economic theory for analyzing
such mergers. There have been some interesting ad hoc developments in economic theory and
analysis (potential competition and probable future competition) that are relevant to market
extension mergers. However, hypothesis testing in this area has proven extremely difficult
primarily due to data limitations. Also, the tendency by economists to rely strictly on the
assumption that profit maximization is the sole or primary motivation of businessmen has
limited our ability to analyze the competitive effects of conglomerate and market extension
mergers, which may largely reflect other motivations such as growth or size maximization.
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tration, they will not effectively limit the increase.32 In view of the
deeply ingrained aversion to concentration of power in the United States,
it seems likely that any proposal for interstate banking will have to in-
clude constraints on nationwide banking concentration if it is to be
feasible.
b. constraining nationwide concentration
There are obviously many different proposals that could be devel-
oped for controlling nationwide banking concentration. This Article
briefly discusses three general proposals to provide some indication as to
the types of proposals that might be reasonably flexible and workable
within the context of a legislative initiative on interstate banking.
33
Neither economic theory nor empirical evidence provides guidance in de-
termining the level at which nationwide banking concentration is too
high.
A simple method for controlling the growth of nationwide concen-
tration would be to prohibit mergers between organizations ranked
among the largest 25, 50 or 100. While this method would prohibit
mergers among the largest banks, those banks would still be able to ex-
pand by acquiring large organizations of a lower size rank, i.e., lower
than 25, 50 or 100. One problem with this method is that a merger be-
tween banks ranked number 99 and 100 would not have the same impli-
cations for aggregate concentration as a merger between banks ranked
number 1 and number 2. However, both mergers would be treated the
same under a rule prohibiting mergers among the largest 100 organiza-
tions. This problem could be overcome partially by prohibiting mergers
between the very largest banks, such as the 25 largest, and prohibiting
those 25 from acquiring any of the other 100 largest organizations. For
example, this modification would allow mergers between those ranked
number 26 and number 100, but prevent their acquisition by number 1
through number 25. Under this method, it is likely that mergers between
organizations ranked number 26 to number 100 would rapidly occur in
the early years of interstate banking. Thus, the nationwide share of those
organizations would increase rapidly while the share of the largest 25
organizations would increase at a lesser rate.
As an alternative, rather than restricting the size of acquisitions
32. The constraining effect of finances on increasing nationwide banking concentration has
recently been discussed in L. KOROBOW & S. WEISBERG, THE COST OF INTERSTATE EXPAN-
SION BY LARGE BANKS (1984) (Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
33. For a detailed discussion of these proposals, see Rhoades & Savage, Controlling Na-
tionwide Concentration Under Interstate Banking, IssuEs BANK REG., 1985.
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among some arbitrary group of banks, as previously illustrated, any or-
ganization with, for example, more than one percent of total United
States banking assets would be prohibited from acquiring any banking
organization with more than $1 billion of assets. Since this method
places greater restraints on the expansion opportunities of a particular
group of large banks without any clear reason for the specific cutoff value
selected, it might be useful to consider a variant of this method which
would place a limit on the quantitative impact that any one merger
would have on nationwide concentration. Specifically, a prohibition
could be imposed on any merger which would increase a nationwide
Herfindahl index by more than some specified amount. A merger be-
tween a firm with a large nationwide share and a small firm with a small
share would have the same effect on concentration as a merger between
two medium size firms and, thus, the two mergers would be treated iden-
tically under such a scheme.
A third method recognizes that one objection to interstate banking
is based on the fear that a state's major banking organizations could be
taken over by outside banks. This method would prohibit the interstate
acquisition of any organization that is the largest in its home state or
holds ten percent or more of its state's banking assets. While this ap-
proach would prevent the acquisition of many of the dominant firms in
states, it would not prevent the acquisition of many of the nation's largest
banks. To account for this, a modification of this method could incorpo-
rate a prohibition on mergers between banks among the top 50
nationwide.
The methods for limiting the nationwide concentration of banking
resources outlined above are merely suggestive. Since, however, avail-
able evidence clearly suggests that under interstate banking nationwide
concentration would increase, it is necessary to consider such proposals
prior to the implementation of interstate banking legislation. Unfortu-
nately, economic theory and evidence do not indicate the level at which
limits should be established.
C. Other Issues Raised by Interstate Banking
The implications of interstate banking for local market and nation-
wide banking concentration are among the most important issues raised.
There are, however, other issues that are frequently raised, and these are
discussed below.
1. The viability of small banks under interstate banking
Many questions have been raised about the ability of small banks,
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especially those tied to local communities, to remain viable in an era of
interstate banking. These questions have arisen in response to the likeli-
hood that interstate banking will result in the interstate expansion of the
nation's largest banking organizations. It is apparently a common per-
ception that small community banks will not be able to operate success-
fully if faced with direct competition from large organizations. Whether
small banks can be expected to withstand such competition can reason-
ably be inferred from their relative efficiency, their demonstrated ability
of inability to compete with the large banks in their own states, their
financial performance vis-a-vis large banks and their ability to adopt
technological advances. There is a substantial body of evidence on these
questions and practically all of its suggests that small banks would re-
main viable in a regime of interstate banking. The evidence on each of
these questions is briefly outlined below.34
If small banks were found to be inherently less cost efficient than
large banks, this would be one basis for questioning the ability of small
banks to survive with interstate banking. The question of relative operat-
ing efficiency of large and small banks in connection with interstate bank-
ing emerges from two very different perspectives. On the one hand,
concern is expressed that small banks will be unable to compete with
large banks because of cost disadvantages. On the other hand, it has
been argued that interstate banking will result in larger banks and will
simultaneously cause a reduction in the number of smaller banks through
mergers. Since, according to this argument, large banks are more effi-
cient, the nation's banking oystem will produce banking services at a
lower cost. Evidence from studies of economies of scale (efficiencies di-
rectly associated with size) in banking provide no support for these
views. Specifically, numerous studies of economies of scale in banking
generally show that economies of scale for basic banking services are not
very large. In fact, there is some evidence that diseconomies (cost ineffi-
ciencies) arise as banks become very large.35
34. For a more detailed review and discussion of this evidence, see Rhoades & Savage, Can
Small Banks Compete?, BANKERS MAG., Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 59; and Rhoades & Savage, Sur-
vival of the Small S&Ls, BANKERS MAG., Sept.-Oct. 1981, at 79. See also Special Issues: Inter-
state Banking, supra note 5.
35. For reviews of the evidence on economies of scale in banking, see McCall, Economies
of Scale, Operating Efficiencies and the Organizational Structure of Commercial Banks, 11 J.
BANK RESEARCH 95 (1980); Benston, The Optimal Banking Structure: Theory and Evidence, 3
J. BANK RESEARCH 220 (1973); Gilbert & Longbrake, The Effects of Branching by Financial
Institutions on Competition, Productive Efficiency and Stability: An Examination of the Evi-
dence, 4 J. BANK RESEARCH 298 (1974). For more recent studies, see Benston, Hanweck &
Humphrey, Scale Economies in Banking: A Restructuring and Reassessment, 14 J. MONEY,
CREDIT & BANKING 435 (1982) (Part I); Clark, Estimates of Economies of Scales in Banking
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One source of evidence on the viability of small banks under inter-
state banking is provided by studies which have examined the growth
experience of small banks when they have faced competition from, or
entry by, large banking organizations. Several studies, going back to the
1960's, have compared the growth of small and large banks in the same
community or the growth of small, independent banks before and after a
large banking organization entered their local market.3 6 These studies
generally indicate that small banks grow at least as fast as banks owned
by large organizations and that entry of a large banking organization into
a local market does not have a significant effect on the growth rate of
small independents. Studies that have compared the relative growth of
small and large banks have generally found that small banks grow
faster.37 Similarly, a recent series of studies has found that new (de novo)
banks established by large banking organizations often do not grow and
acquire market share as rapidly as new (de novo) independent banks, and
that the independent banks perform just as well even when they are oper-
ating in the same local market.38 In short, past experience indicates that
small banks have historically remained effective, viable competitors, in
terms of growth and market share, in the face of competition from much
larger organizations.
Comparisons of various financial ratios that are important indica-
tors of the performance and viability of a bank also show that small
banks perform quite well in relation to larger ones. Studies have found
that the profitability of small banks is not adversely affected by entry into
their market by large banking organizations.39 More recent studies have
found that small banks tend to be more profitable than their larger coun-
Using A Generalized Functional Form, 16 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 53 (1984); Gilligan,
Smirlock & Marshall, Scale and Scope Economies in the Multi-Product Banking Firm, 13 J.
MONETARY ECON. 393 (1984). It is notable that some of the most important studies use the
Federal Reserve's Functional Cost Analysis data. These data do not include the very largest
banks.
36. See, e.g., E. KOHN, THE FUTURE OF SMALL BANKS (Dec. 1966) (New York State
Banking Department); Darnell & Keen, Small Bank Survival: Is the Wolf At the Door?, Bus.
REv., Nov. 1974, at 16 (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia); Rhoades & Savage, supra note
34.
37. See Alhadeff & Alhadeff, Growth of Large Banks, 1930-1960, 46 REv. ECON. & STA-
TISTICS 356 (1964); Rhoades & Yeats, Growth, Consolidation and Mergers in Banking, 29 J.
FIN. 1937 (1974).
38. See, e.g., Rose & Savage, Bank Holding Company De Novo Entry and Market Share
Accumulation, 26 ANTrrRUST BULL. 753 (1981); Rose & Savage, De Novo Entry and Bank
Performance: Bank Holding Companies Versus Independent Banks, 15 J. BANK RESEARCH 95
(1984). See also King, The Impact of Local Market Entry By Large Bank Holding Companies,
ECON. REv., Nov. 1982, at 41 (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta).
39. E. KOHN, supra note 36; Darnell & Keen, supra note 36.
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terparts.4 These recent studies, along with year-end 1983 data on bank
profitability, indicate that small banks have remained more profitable
even after the implementation of bank deregulation. A particularly rele-
vant study compared various financial ratios of the very smallest and
very largest banks located in the same metropolitan areas.41 This study
found that the smallest banks in these metropolitan areas were more
profitable, better capitalized and grew faster than their large counter-
parts. The financial ratios also indicated that small banks had higher
nonoperating expenses and loan losses than the larger banks.
At least until recently, many have suspected that technological de-
velopments in the area of electronic funds transfer and various electron-
ics equipment would place small banks at a disadvantage in relation to
large banks. Such devices as automated teller machines, point of sale
terminals and computers hold out the prospect of substantially reducing
labor requirements and the need for processing and sorting of paper
items, as well as providing greater convenience to customers. If the im-
plementation of this equipment significantly reduces costs and provides
added convenience to consumers, small banks would be at a significant
disadvantage if they could not, for whatever reason, employ the new
technology. However, the evidence through 1983 on the use and availa-
bility of increasingly inexpensive electronic equipment along with the op-
portunity for joining shared networks suggests that small banks can and
do successfully employ the new electronic technology.42
In sum, available evidence on scale economies, growth, profitability
and the use of developments in electronic technology for large and small
banks suggests that small banks would be viable competitors in an era of
interstate banking. There does not appear to be any reason to believe
that small banks would be at an inherent disadvantage vis-a-vis larger
organizations.
40. See, eg., Opper, Profitability of Insured Commercial Banks, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 453
(1982); Kolari & Fraser, The Effects of Deregulation on Bank Profitability: Can Small Banks
Survive?, J. RETAIL BANKING, Fall 1984, at 1; Danker & McLaughlin, Profitability of Insured
Commercial Banks in 1983, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 802 (1984).
41. See Rhoades & Savage, supra note 34.
42. Old and new survey evidence supports this conclusion. See D. WALKER, CONTRASTS
AMONG BANKS WITH RETAIL ELECTRONIC BANKING MACHINES AND ALL INSURED
BANKS: 1974 VS. 1976 (1977) (FDIC Working Paper 77-1); L. MANDELL, EFTs AND COMPE-
TITION IN NATIONAL BANKS (1976) (Southern Methodist Univ. Working Paper 93); Special
Issue: Interstate Banking, supra note 5; F. SCHROEDER, ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER ACT
COMPLIANCE COSTS AND CONSUMER BENEFITS: RECENT SURVEY EVIDENCE, Staff Studies
No. 143 (1985) (Federal Reserve Board); TRANS DATA CORP., ATMs: CURRENT STATUS,
TRENDS AND SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT (1983); AM. BANKERS A., NATIONAL OPERATIONS/
AUTOMATION SURVEY, 1981 (1981).
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2. Credit allocation
One suggested benefit of interstate banking is the enhancement of
efficiency in credit allocation in the United States. That is, it is possible
that credit would be allocated throughout the country more rapidly in
response to changing demand and supply conditions-away from rela-
tively low demand areas and services and to high demand areas and serv-
ices. From a purely economic standpoint, the efficiency of resource
allocation in response to consumer demand is a critical gauge of the over-
all performance of an economic system. Indeed, this is the primary eco-
nomic basis for the judgment that a free market, capitalist system is
superior to a socialist one. Unfortunately, there is very little direct em-
pirical evidence on which to base a conclusion regarding the effect of
interstate banking on credit allocation efficiency.
A priori, the view that credit would be allocated more efficiently
under a regime of interstate banking, presumably due to the superiority
of allocation decisions by individual banking firms rather than by the
present market-based system, seems rather unlikely.43 Through the years,
the market has developed a number of very efficient mechanisms for
moving credit around the country (e.g., the federal funds market, in-
terbank loans, correspondent banking and certificates of deposit).' De-
velopments in communications and electronic technology have further
enhanced the market's efficiency in this respect. Furthermore, one very
limited empirical study compared the credit allocation efficiency of mul-
timarket banking organizations with the credit allocation efficiency of in-
dependent banks across the same markets. Test results revealed no
difference between the two organizational structures.45 Thus, the exist-
ence of efficient mechanisms for credit allocation, along with very limited
empirical evidence, does not suggest that credit allocation in the United
43. The argument that internal resource allocation decisions are more efficient than re-
source allocation decisions made through market mechanisms presumably refers to the cost
efficiency of allocating resources rather than to allocative efficiency in the economic sense,
although this fundamental distinction is generally not made. The supposedly lower cost of
allocating resources internal to the firm is often attributed to relatively low information and
transaction costs. Even the cost efficiency claims for internal resource allocation are highly
debatable because of difficulties in allocating overhead costs and the inherent inefficiency and
varied objectives of managers in a large bureaucracy. A theoretical discussion for the operat-
ing and allocative efficiency advantages and disadvantages of markets vis-a-vis large firms con-
cludes that the organizational form of the firm is a key determinant. See 0. WILLIAMSON,
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTrRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975).
44. It is not possible to demonstrate that these mechanisms for credit allocation are more
or less efficient than some other method.
45. Rhoades, A Note on the Resource-Allocation Efficiency of MBHCs Versus Independent
Banks, Q. REV. ECON. & Bus., Summer 1983, at 112.
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States would be significantly improved by a move to interstate banking.
However, one very important caveat is an order. We simply do not know
what allocative efficiency gains might result from a complete removal of
barriers to geographic expansion, wherein firms would be able to allocate
plant and equipment freely in response to market forces. Thus, the po-
tential exists from some unforeseen gains in this area with no apparent
risk of losses.
It is notable that while there may be no demonstrable gains in allo-
cative efficiency as a result of interstate banking, gains are likely for the
system as a whole in terms of some aspects of operating efficiency. In
particular, with the development of interstate banking, there is likely to
be a corresponding increase in electronic funds transfer.46 This will occur
because firms are more prepared and willing to transfer internal funds
electronically than are the marketplace and consumers at this time.
Thus, an increased amount of electronic funds transfer would probably
take place within larger interstate institutions. This operating cost ad-
vantage is, however, only short term in nature because the marketplace,
including consumers, can be expected to fully accept the electronic tech-
nology in the future.
III. PRODUCT LINE EXPANSION FOR BANKING ORGANIZATIONS
The implications of product line expansion are decidedly more prob-
lematic than those raised by interstate banking. There are at least four
reasons for this. First, even the most basic question as to whether there
is any foundation for Congress and the bank regulators to be concerned
with the issue of product line expansion is subject to debate. Specifically,
there is debate over whether banks are inherently different from other
businesses and, therefore, should be regulated as to the product lines they
enter. Second, even if banks are judged to be inherently different, and
thus to warrant regulation, there is debate over whether the bank holding
company device insulates banks from the financial problems of their par-
ent bank holding company and nonbank affiliates. Third, there is very
little systematic empirical evidence that is directly relevant to the ques-
tions raised by product line expansion by banking organizations. Fourth,
in contrast with interstate banking, product line expansion may carry
highly significant externalities that could threaten the safety and sound-
ness on the banking system. For these reasons, any conclusions regard-
ing the desirability of product line expansion are considerably more
46. D. HUMPHREY, THE U.S. PAYMENTS SYSTEM: COST, PRICING, COMPETITION, AND
RISK 109 (1984) (Solomon Brothers Center for the Study of Financial Institutions).
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suspect and judgmental than conclusions drawn with respect to interstate
banking.
Product line expansion by banking organizations raises numerous
questions. These include questions regarding the implications of product
line expansion for tie-in arrangements, conflicts of interest, undue con-
centration of financial resources, efficiency and risk. This Article, how-
ever, focuses only on the risk implications. The emphasis on risk is not
intended to suggest that these other questions are not relevant or impor-
tant. Indeed, since the banking industry, unlike any other industry, pro-
vides an important, arguably essential, input or service to most
businesses and consumers in the country, the possibility for tie-in ar-
rangements and conflicts of interest as a result of product line expansion
is quite real. Expansion of banks into additional product lines would
establish business relationships that are conducive to both tie-in arrange-
ments and conflicts of interest. However, because existing laws dealing
with these problems could be tightened in the event of product line ex-
pansion and because credit markets are relatively competitive, such is-
sues are not as critical as the risk question. However, two very important
caveats are in order. First, it is, of course, recognized that laws are not
always effective. Although laws prohibiting murder, robbery and price-
fixing exist, our prisons are full and the Justice Department continues to
prosecute price-fixing cases. Consequently, laws will not eliminate unde-
sired behavior without vigorous enforcement. Secondly, competition in
credit markets is relatively strong, which tends to inhibit tie-in arrange-
ments and conflicts of interest because of the availability of alternative
sources of credit. If, however, antitrust policy toward mergers were to
become lax, an environment conducive to conflicts of interest and tie-in
arrangements could easily develop.47
The potential for an increase in the concentration of financial re-
sources as a consequence of product line expansion is also a real and
47. A recent study presents results of a simulation of the horizontal merger activity that
could take place under the 1982 Justice Department merger guidelines. The findings indicate,
for example, that the Chicago banking market, which now has 407 banks, could conceivably
have four banks as a result of horizontal mergers that would be permissible under the guide-
lines. Furthermore, under the guidelines, it is possible for practically all local banking markets
in the country to wind up with a Herfindahl index greater than 1800, even though the guide-
lines state that markets with a Herfindahl index above 1800 are highly concentrated. See J.
BURKE, ANTITRUST LAWS, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES, AND THE LIMrrs OF CON-
CENTRATION IN LOCAL BANKING MARKETS, Staff Studies No. 138 (1984) (Federal Reserve
Board). Also, another recent study indicates that the number of bank mergers and acquisi-
tions in 1981, 1982 and 1983 was substantially higher than the number in previous years. See
S. RHOADES, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS BY COMMERCIAL BANKS, 1960-83, Staff Studies
No. 142 (1985) (Federal Reserve Board).
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important issue.4" The largest banking organizations dwarf the largest
insurance and securities firms. It is conceivable, therefore, that if banks
were permitted to enter these activities, they could, by acquisition, domi-
nate these other industries. Due to the straightforward manner in which
this problem would develop and because legislation permitting product
line expansion could incorporate relatively simple restraints on inter-
industry acquisitions, this problem appears to be manageable.
In addition, it is often argued that product line expansion will result
in greater efficiency due to large firms offering a wider range of services
and will yield economies of scale and economies of "scope." However, as
previously discussed, economies of scale in the banking and the savings
and loan industries are not very important.49 Regarding economies of
"scope" (efficiencies associated with a wider range of products), there are
only two relevant studies, and the results are mixed. 0 There may, how-
ever, be efficiencies arising from the availability of one-step shopping for
consumers. Nevertheless, historical experience provides some indication,
discussed later, that significant product line expansion may result in op-
erating inefficiencies and increased risk."1 Therefore, the efficiency issue
will be discussed as an element of the risk issue.
In contrast to the other issues raised by product line expansion, the
risk issue is critical to the safety and soundness of the banking system
and is not clearly manageable, although various deposit insurance
schemes (public and private) and increased market discipline have been
proposed as methods of managing bank risk."2 For this reason, this dis-
48. For a very thoughtful analysis of the antitrust implications of product line expansion,
see Solomon, Bank Product Deregulation: Some Antitrust Tradeoffs, ECON. REV., May 1984,
at 20 (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta).
49. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
50. For a study which did not find economies of scope, see G. BENSTON, A. BERGER, G.
HANWECK & D. HUMPHREY, ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND SCOPE IN BANKING in PROCEED-
INGS OF A CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION 432 (May 1983). How-
ever, for a study which found economies of scope, see Gilligan, Smirlock & Marshall, Scale
and Scope Economies in the Multi-Product Banking Firm, 13 J. MONETARY ECON. 393 (1984).
Some industry participants question whether efficiency gains are likely. For example, Leo
Walsh, Jr., chief investment officer of Equitable Life Assurance Society observed that "[p]eople
have been touting the synergy that comes from combining financial institutions, but we frankly
don't believe in it." A Financial Service Merger That Breaks the Mold, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 19,
1984, at 147, 150.
51. See infra notes 105-115 and accompanying text.
52. There is, for example, a great deal of controversy today over various deposit insurance
schemes that might be implemented to make banks pay a premium for taking on additional
risk. These include the payment of variable rate deposit insurance premiums to the FDIC and,
more radically, the implementation of a private deposit insurance system. See, e.g., Gibson,
Deposit Insurance in the United States: Evaluation and Reform, 7 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 1575 (1972); Buser, Chen & Kane, Federal Deposit Insurance, Regulatory Policy
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cussion of the implications of product line expansion for banking organi-
zations focuses on the risk issue. It is emphasized, however, that the
other issue raised by product line expansion are not trivial and should
not be ignored in policy deliberations.
A. Basic Questions
Before embarking on any discussion of the issues raised by product
line expansion for banking organizations, two basic questions should be
answered. First, is the role of commercial banks in the financial system
sufficiently unique and critical that it is important to consider whether
expansion of their product lines would create the potential for financial
problems that would compromise the intergrity of the system? Second,
could a commercial bank be financially vulnerable in the event that its
parent holding company or a nonbank affiliate encounters financial diffi-
culties? If the answer to either or both of these questions is no, there is
little point in lengthy discussion of the safety and soundness implications
of product line expansion, which is generally regarded as the most crucial
issue raised by product line deregulation. Thus, if commercial banks are
not sufficiently unique and critical to the functioning of the system, there
is no great cause for concern about the possible risk implications of prod-
uct line expansion. Similarly, if a commercial bank is not vulnerable to
the financial problems of its parent or nonbank affiliate, i.e., the bank is
and Optimal Bank Capital, 36 J. FIN. 51 (1981); FED. DEPOSrr INSURANCE CORP., DEPOSIT
INSURANCE IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT (Apr. 15, 1983); FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK
BOARD, AGENDA FOR REFORM: A REPORT ON DEPosrr INSURANCE (Mar. 23, 1983);
Kareken, Deposit Insurance Reform or Deregulation Is the Cart, Not the Horse, Q. REv.,
Spring 1983, at I (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis). For a number of recent papers on
the deposit insurance issue, see FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO, PROCEEDINGS OF A
CONFERENCE ON BANK STRucruRE AND COMPETITION 196 (May 1983). Although there are
no clear answers, it does seem certain that the federal government would still have to remain in
the business as a backup insurer if a private deposit system were implemented. Consequently,
a net gain would not necessarily result. With respect to increasing market discipline as a
constraint on bank risk taking, controversy and uncertainty also exists. It has been suggested,
for example, that more detailed information regarding the loans, such as their current status,
could be made public by banks. Alternatively, the FDIC could firmly implement a policy of
not paying off deposits in excess of the legally insured $100,000 in the event of a bank failure, a
policy not followed in the past. Such schemes are likely to increase market discipline in the
sense of making large, sophisticated investors and depositors sensitive to the risk position of
the banks in which they place funds. However, such schemes may also lead to a very large and
rapid run on banks at the slightest sign or rumor of financial difficulty. Therefore, such meas-
ures appear to be somewhat self-defeating. The recent experience with Continental Illinois
suggests the potential for this problem. Some of the deposit losses experienced by Continental
appear to have been in response to a modified payout on deposits of over $100,000 undertaken
by the FDIC in the earlier Penn Square failure. Consequently, the FDIC announced that it
would stand behind all of the deposits in Continental and its parent holding company.
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"insulated" from its holding company, product line expansion would
presumably have no risk implications for the bank. In short, if the an-
swer to either or both of the two questions posed above is no, the product
line expansion question becomes largely moot.
1. Are banks unique and critical?
A lengthy statement of the position that banks are unique and criti-
cal to the economic system has been presented by Corrigan. 3 According
to this statement, three basic characteristics make banks unique and criti-
cal to the system. First, only banks (and thrifts to an increasing extent)
offer transaction accounts, which are liabilities incurred that are payable
on demand at par and are readily transferable by the owner to third par-
ties. These transaction accounts are the heart of the payments mecha-
nism and are the basis of the daily financial transactions by consumers
and businesses.54 Second, banks are the underlying source of liquidity to
other institutions. Specifically, banks can and do provide credit and
credit lines to all other institutions in the system, even at times when
other credit sources are unavailable. This is possible as a result of their
varied sources of liquidity and their ability literally to create money by
issuing demand deposits-a function which is assured because of the di-
rect connection to the central bank. Third, commercial banks are the
"transmission belt" for monetary policy. That is, through commercial
banks, the central bank carries out policies to influence financial markets
on a daily basis and to preserve financial stability in times of financial
crisis. This function is facilitated by the link between the central bank
and commercial banks resulting from reserve requirements and the dis-
count window through which the central bank serves as lender of last
resort.55 For these reasons, banks serve an essential public interest role,
and consequently, it is necessary to ensure their safety and soundness.
53. Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, in ANN. REP. 1 (1982) (Federal Reserve Bank of Minne-
apolis). See also Financial Services Industry-Oversight: Hearings Before the Comm. on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1983) (statement of Paul A. Volcker,
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board). For a related but more general argument, see Long-
streth, In Search of A Safety Net for the Financial Services Industry, BANKERS MAG. July-Aug.
1983, at 27.
54. It is notable that alternatives to the transaction accounts offered by banks, such as the
money market mutual funds, ultimately rely on commercial banks for payment.
55. Alternative schemes for implementing monetary policy that do not rely on commercial
banks have been proposed, but it is not clear that these would not ultimately depend on com-
mercial banks along with the central bank. More importantly, in view of the uncertainty re-
garding the workability of these alternative systems and the apparent efficiency of the present
system, it would seem very difficult to justify adopting an alternative system.
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This requires regulation including limitations on the product lines or as-
set powers of banks.
The opposing view has been presented by Pierce, who uses Corri-
gan's paper as the basis for his discussion. 6 Pierce rejects Corrigan's
conclusion that banks should largely be separated from nonbank finan-
cial activities to ensure the safety and soundness of the banking system
and the impartiality of bank credit decisions. He argues that banks are
not unique in the three areas outlined by Corrigan because there are al-
ternatives in the market to each of the "special" functions. Furthermore,
Pierce contends that even if banks were special, their ability to perform
these functions would not be affected if they engaged in new financial
services.
A more cautious and less sweeping rebuttal to the argument that
banks are unique and critical to the system has recently been presented
by Saunders. 7 In contrast to Pierce, Saunders agrees that the transac-
tion account function is indeed special and is of sufficient importance to
the economy and society that it is imperative to preserve the integrity of
the banking system. Furthermore, while agreeing that safety and sound-
ness considerations are very important, Saunders concludes that securi-
ties underwriting could be undertaken by bank holding company
affiliates without jeopardizing bank safety and soundness, although cer-
tain safeguards may be required.
On balance, the position of Corrigan is more persuasive than that of
Pierce, although Pierce's argument that there are substitutes for essential
bank services has a recognized theoretical position. 8 However, the key
weakness of the Pierce position is that it seems to discount very heavily
the externalities of widespread bank failure, particularly in connection
with the payments mechanism. In spite of the fact that there are substi-
tutes for various bank services, such as commercial paper and money
market mutual funds, these substitutes are not perfect, and the providers
of these substitutes operate within an institutional framework that rests
upon the banking system. Furthermore, the externalities resulting from
bank failures are more far-reaching, effecting the functioning of the pay-
ments system, than are widespread failures in other industries. Thus,
56. Pierce, An Essay on the Expansion of Banking Powers, in DEREGULATING WALL
STREET: COMMERCIAL BANK PENETRATION OF THE CORPORATE SECURITIES MARKET ch.
2 (I. Walter ed. 1985).
57. A. SAUNDERS, AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ON BANK UNIQUENESS AND CORPO-
RATE SECURITIES AcTIVrIES (May 1984).
58. This theoretical position probably originated with J. GURLEY & E. SHAw, MONEY IN
A THEORY OF FINANCE (1960).
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banks are in a unique position that is critical to the financial system.59 In
any event, having reached the conclusion that banks are unique and criti-
cal to the system, preserving the safety and soundness of the system is
essential. Consequently, the answer to the first basic question of whether
it is important to consider whether product line expansion might increase
risk in the banking system is yes.
2. Are banks insulated from parents and affiliates?
The second basic question is whether a commercial bank is insulated
from the financial problems that may be encountered by its parent hold-
ing company or nonbank affiliates. In a recent paper, Chase and Waage
argue tht the legal doctrine of "corporate separateness," which insulates
the bank from its parent and nonbank affiliates, offers a promising basis
for product line expansion.' Because there is considerable direct and
indirect economic evidence suggesting that commercial banks cannot be
effectively insulated from their parents and affiliates, this Article will
briefly outline some of this evidence rather than discuss the merits of the
paper by Chase and Waage.61
It appears that the legal doctrine of corporate separateness is an un-
certain tool for insulating banks from the financial misfortunes of a bank
holding company parent or its nonbank affiliates. More importantly, re-
gardless of the effectiveness of the legal doctrine of corporate separate-
ness, the perception of regulators and market participants (i.e., bank
holding company managers and the investing and depositing public) re-
garding the separability of the financial fortunes of the various compo-
nents of the bank holding company is a critical determinant of the extent
to which the bank subsidiaries are insulated from the financial problems
in other parts of a bank holding company. If the bank holding company
is operated as a single entity or is perceived as such, financial problems of
parent holding companies and nonbank affiliates are likely to plague the
bank.
59. This hinges on the position that the government must stand behind the payments
mechanism.
60. S. CHASE & D. WAAGE, CORPORATE SEPARATENESS As A TOOL OF BANK REGULA-
TION (1983) (prepared for the American Bankers Association). The view that the legal con-
cept of corporate separateness insulates banks from their parents and affiliates appears to be
implicit in the Treasury Department's formal legislative proposal for product line deregula-
tion. See Financial Institutions Deregulation Act of 1983, S. 1609, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983).
61. This discussion is based on input from Anthony Cornyn, Gerald Hanweck and John
Rose.
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economic considerations
Studies pertaining to holding company operating policies suggest
that bank holding companies have tended to integrate their various units.
Early studies of bank holding company operating policies were reviewed
in a 1978 compendium on the bank holding company movement, pre-
pared by the staff of the Federal Reserve Board.62 Even though the evi-
dence is limited, the reviewer concluded that it suggests that bank
holding companies tend to operate their organizations more like single,
integrated entities than like collections of commonly owned but autono-
mous companies. Evidence from two more recent studies is generally
consistent with that reported in the earlier works and suggests that, while
the degree of centralization varies considerably across organizations,
holding companies exert at least some effort to centralize and integrate
the operations of their subsidiaries.63
Another body of literature pertaining to bank holding company op-
erating policies is a set of studies which examines the movement of funds
between different units within the holding company system. One study
concludes that "the evidence is consistent with the premise that bank
holding companies operate as intergrated entities and that this interde-
pendence among component firms may affect the safety and soundness of
affiliated banks."" A second study takes a broader look at interaffiliate
cash flows by examining both upstream and downstream funds transfers
between the parent company and its bank and nonbank subsidiaries.6"
The author reports several findings consistent with a single-entity view of
bank holding companies.
In addition to the evidence regarding bank holding companies' own
operating policies, there is evidence suggesting that market partici-
pants-large depositors, equity and credit analysts and the public in gen-
eral-tend to view bank holding companies as single entities. For
example, while there is widespread agreement among financial analysts
that a thorough analysis of a bank holding company should include an
62. Rose, Bank Holding Companies As Operational Single Entities, in THE BANK HOLD-
ING COMPANY MOVEMENT TO 1978: A COMPENDIUM 69 (1978) (Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System).
63. W. MURRAY, BANK HOLDING COMPANY CENTRALIZATION POLICIES (Feb. 1979)
(prepared for the Association of Bank Holding Companies by Golembe Associates, Inc.);
Whalen, Operational Policies of Multibank Holding Companies, ECON. REv., Winter 1981-
1982, at 20 (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland).
64. Mayne, Bank Holding Company Characteristics and the Upstreaming of Bank Funds,
12 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 209 (1980).
65. Mayne, Funds Transfer Between Bank Holding Companies and Their Affiliates, 11 J.
BANK RESEARCH 20 (1980).
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analysis of the major segments or units of the enterprise, this is not al-
ways possible given the available data. As a result, analysts typically
limit their attention to the financial statements of the consolidated organ-
ization. 6 The focus on consolidated statements also reflects the financial
disclosure requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SE). The SEC requires bank holding companies to file consolidated
financial statements. Separate financial statements for bank and nonbank
subsidiaries are not required, nor are separate financial statements man-
dated for the parent company.67
Along with the evidence suggesting that the investing public may
regard the units of a bank holding company as interdependent, there is
both direct and indirect evidence that depositors may assume such inter-
dependence. For example, in 1973, Beverly Hills Bancorp, the parent of
Beverly Hills National Bank, held loans to a real estate developer that
had been funded with sales of commercial paper. When the developer
could not repay the loans, the holding company was unable to pay off its
maturing commercial paper obligations. The adverse publicity that ac-
companied this default resulted in large-scale runs on the Beverly Hills
National Bank. Furthermore, it appears that bank holding company
management will support nonbank affiliates that get into financial diffi-
culty in order to maintain market confidence in the organization. For
example, United California Bank, in 1970, voluntarily assumed responsi-
bility for the debts of its Swiss bank subsidiary, which failed after incur-
ring losses of nearly $40 million from unauthorized speculation in cocoa
futures. Other examples of banking organizations taking significant steps
to preserve the public's perception of their reputation and financial
strength are situations involving bank holding company-sponsored real
estate investments trusts (REITs) in the mid-1970's. Often the real estate
investment problems were transferred to the sponsoring bank. This sup-
port was provided even though the banks were under no legal obligation
to do so.68 More generally, Walter Wriston has observed:
For example, it is inconceivable that any major bank would
66. See Wooden & Paluszek, Disclosure Needs of Financial Analysts: Large Bank Holding
Companies, EcoN. REv., Nov. 1983, at 77 (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta).
67. In 1981, the SEC eliminated the requirement for separate, complete financial state-
ments for the parent company. Now, the SEC requires the presentation of only condensed
financial information about the parent company in the footnotes to a bank holding company's
consolidated financial statements.
68. Even though the REIT problems have passed, Standard & Poor's considers the
strength of the link between the REIT and its sponsor an important rating consideration.
They argue that "if the REIT bears the sponsor's name there is a definite economic incentive
for the sponsor to keep the REIT solvent and avoid any negative publicity." STANDARD &
POOR'S, CREDrr OvER V W 59 (Aug. 1983).
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walk away from any subsidiary of its holding company. If your
name's on the door, all of your capital funds are going to be-
hind it in the real world. Lawyers can say you have separation,
but the marketplace is persuasive, and it would not see it that
way.
69
Evidence indicates that, consistent with the perceptions of holding
company management and the investing and depositing public, federal
authorities generally view bank holding companies as single, intergrated
entities. For example, the Federal Reserve Board has long considered all
of a holding company's bank affiliates operating within the same local
market as a single banking entity for purposes of competitive analysis.7 0
The United States Department of Justice consistently has considered the
holding company organization as a single entity, given a product and
geographic market. The courts have regularly followed this approach as
well.
While federal law and regulation generally treat affiliated bank sub-
sidiaries within a multibank holding company system as separate units
for purposes of monetary policy,7 1 the Federal Reserve Board has tradi-
tionally viewed the bank and nonbank sectors of a holding company or-
ganization as a single entity for such purposes. In particular, the Board
has been sensitive to banking innovations involving the use of the holding
company corporate structure to circumvent regulations designed for pur-
poses of monetary policy, specifically Regulation D72 (reserve require-
ments) and Regulation Q73 (interest on deposits). In 1974, Congress, in
response to initiatives by several large holding companies to issue small-
denomination, floating-rate thrift notes in order to circumvent Regula-
tion Q restrictions, authorized the regulators to limit interest rates on
holding company debt obligations (other than commercial paper) that
could serve as substitutes for consumer deposits issued by depository in-
69. Financial Institutions Restructuring and Services Act of 1981: Hearings Before the
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 589-90 (1981) (state-
ment of Walter Wriston, Chairman, Citicorp).
70. A survey of the earliest Board decisions pursuant to § 3 of the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956 reveals that the Board has always used this approach in its competitive analysis.
See, for example, Board orders denying the applications by Northwest Bancorporation, Minne-
apolis, 44 Fed. Res. Bull. 11 (1958), and Wisconsin Bankshares Corporation, Milwaukee, id. at
15, to organize de novo bank subsidiaries.
71. For example, the reserve requirements of the Federal Reserve are applied to each bank
subsidiary individually. Because of graduated reserve requirements, the total amount of
reserves required of a multibank holding company is less than that required if all the sister
bank subsidiaries were consolidated into a single banking entity.
72. 12 C.F.R. § 204 (1984).
73. 12 C.F.R. § 217 (1984).
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stitutions, 'regardless of the intended use of the proceeds of the debt. 4
Further evidence of congressional concern that the integrated nature
of the bank holding company organization might pose problems for bank
soundness is provided in section 3(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956."1 This section directed the Federal Reserve Board, in judging
bank acquisitions by holding companies, to consider, among other
things, "(1) the financial history and condition of the company or compa-
nies and the banks concerned; (2) their prospects; [and] (3) the character
of their management .... 76 The 1970 Amendments to the Bank
Holding Company Act clearly provided that the Board should give atten-
tion to bank soundness in judging the permissibility of nonbanking activi-
ties for bank holding companies." Section 4(c)(8) of the Amended Act
specifies a number of possible adverse effects for the Board to consider in
judging bank holding company applications to acquire nonbank firms.
Among these is "unsound banking practices." 78
Supervisory concern over the implications of the bank holding com-
pany corporate structure for bank soundness surfaced shortly after the
1970 Amendments. Beginning in 1972, the Federal Reserve Board re-
quired each bank holding company to submit financial statements for the
consolidated organization, the parent holding company and all nonbank
subsidiaries of the parent.79 In June 1974, the Federal Reserve Board
announced its "go-slow" policy of restricting bank holding company ex-
pansion, both geographically and in terms of additional nonbanking ac-
tivities, in order to limit bank risk exposure during a period of lessened
financial stability. 0
Federal regulators took steps in 1978 and 1979, analogous to the
restrictions imposed by section 23A, to protect subsidiary banks from
abuse by holding company affiliates. In 1978, the Comptroller of the
74. Pub. L. No. 93-501, 88 Stat. 1557 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.). For legislative history of this Act, see S. REP. No. 1120, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6249.
75. Pub. L. No. 511, 70 Stat. 133, 135 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1982)).
76. Id.
77. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607 § 103, 84 Stat.
1760, 1765 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982)).
78. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
79. Section 5(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act authorizes the Federal Reserve Board
to acquire reports from bank holding companies as well as to examine each holding company
and each subsidiary thereof. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c) (1982). Financial statements for each bank
subsidiary are filed with the bank's primary federal supervisor.
80. For a discussion of the rationale underlying this policy, see Address by Arthur F.
Bums, Maintaining the Soundness of Our Banking System, 1974 American Bankers Associa-
tion Convention, in Honolulu (Oct. 21, 1974).
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Currency criticized the practice of some national banks of paying various
fees to holding company affiliates (and other insiders) in excess of the
value of goods and services received.81 At about the same time, the Fed-
eral Reserve Board criticized intraholding company income and tax ac-
counting transfers "that have the effect of transferring assets and income
from the subsidiary banks to the parent company without offsetting bene-
fits to the banks."82
In view of the considerations outlined above, regardless of the effec-
tiveness of the legal doctrine of corporate separateness, it appears as
though bank holding company management, investors and depositors
perceive the financial fortunes of various parts of a bank holding com-
pany as interdependent. Their actions will tend to make them so. The
regulators must respond accordingly.
B. Implications for Risk
Having accepted the propositions that commercial banks occupy a
unique position in the economic system and that they are not effectively
insulated from their parent holding companies and nonbank affiliates, it
is critical that the question regarding the likely effects of product line
expansion be addressed. Indeed, this question involves the safety and
soundness of the banking system. Some empirical studies have examined
the risk implications of product line expansion by banking organizations.
These studies generally conclude that the evidence, along with elements
of finance theory, suggests that the diversification afforded by product
line expansion may reduce the risk of bank failure or at least not increase
that risk. This conclusion is typically based on a comparison of the
levels, and variance and covariance, of rates of return in banking with
those of various nonbanking activities and on the concept in finance the-
ory that portfolio diversification (assuming that variance and covariance
of the returns of different investments are not perfectly correlated) will
reduce risk.83 These studies are briefly discussed below.
81. See CofC Tells Banks Not to Enrich Insiders With Exorbitant Fees, Am. Banker, Sept.
11, 1978, at 1, col. 3.
82. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Policy Statement Regarding Inter-
corporate Income Tax Accounting Transactions of Bank Holding Companies and State-
Chartered Banks that are Members of the Federal Reserve System, Press Release (Sept. 25,
1978).
83. The correlation of variance and covariance of rates of return is intended to indicate
whether fluctuation in rates of return for banks coincide with or are offset by fluctuations in
rates of return in nonbanking activities. If variations in bank returns coincide with the varia-
tion of returns of nonbanking activities, the diversification permitted by product line expansion
would not provide risk reducing benefits and might increase risk. If, however, variations in
rates of return of banking are offset by those of nonbanking activities, diversification would
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Before discussing these studies, it should be noted that most of them
overlook what appear to be two very important considerations. First,
finance theory indicates that an investor can reduce risk by properly di-
versifying a portfolio. As demonstrated below, however, it appears that
it is not appropriate to apply this line of reasoning to diversification by a
firm. Second, historical evidence concerning diversification in industry
combined with very limited evidence regarding diversification in banking
suggests that operating risks may increase as the range of operations con-
ducted by a firm increases. Put differently, it appears that as the size and
range of operations of a firm increase, top management does not have the
range of expertise, or time, to effectively manage the enterprise.
The remainder of this section examines empirical studies of risk as-
sociated with nonbanking activities for banks and additional considera-
tions, generally overlooked, that must be examined in assessing the risk
implications of product line expansion.
1. Evidence on product line expansion and risk
Because a large sample of widely diversified bank holding companies
does not exist, data from actual observation comparing the risks of diver-
sified bank holding companies, the type which might result if proposals
for product line expansion were adopted, with the risks of undiversified
bank holding companies are not available. Nevertheless, because of the
importance of the issue, a number of studies have approached the ques-
tion indirectly. Most of these studies have compared the risk of certain
nonbanking activities with the risk in banking, either separately or in
combination. Two studies have directly compared diversified (to the ex-
tent possible under the current regulatory scheme) and undiversified
bank holding companies. Finally, a couple of recent studies have ex-
amined investor reaction to banks' involvement in nonbanking activities.
Johnson and Meinster examined thirteen industries which were pos-
sible candidates for bank holding company expansion. Using Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) data for 1954 through 1969, they constructed
measures of the level and variance in rates of return and examined their
correlation with banking. Johnson and Meinster concluded that bank
holding companies could reduce risk or increase returns by product line
expansion. s4 A similar study was conducted by Heggestad. He used IRS
theoretically reduce risk. This conclusion, however, rests on the inappropriate assumption
that bank holding company diversification is analogous to pure financial diversification
through investments in securities. See infra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
84. Johnson & Meinster, Bank Holding Companies: Diversification Opportunities in Non-
bank Activities, E. ECON. J., Oct. 1974, at 316.
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data for 1953 through 1967 to construct measures of levels and variations
in rates of return for thirteen nonbanking industries. Based on his re-
search, Heggestad concluded very cautiously that product line expansion
may reduce risk for banking organizations.15 Eisemann examined levels
and variations in rates of return during the 1960's for twenty nonbanking
activities using data from various sources. He concluded that banking is
one of the lowest risk activities and that limited diversification can reduce
risk.
8 6
Using a theoretical approach, based on principles from portfolio the-
ory, Blair and Heggestad concluded that product line expansion would
reduce risk for banks.87 Jessee and Seelig used a more direct approach
than other studies by comparing the coefficient of variation of a sample of
bank holding companies with that of a sample of independent banks. It
is notable that their conclusions differed from those of most other stud-
ies, which relied on inferences from portfolio theory rather than on direct
evidence on the risk effect of diversification. They concluded that bank
holding company risk is no lower than the risk associated with independ-
ent banks and that diversified bank holding companies do not exhibit
lower risk than those which are not diversified.88 Since this evidence,
based on actual results of diversification by bank holding companies, is
contrary to the results of studies that rely on inferences from portfolio
theory, which treat nonbanking activities as securities to be held in a
portfolio, it appears that other factors affecting actual risk of bank hold-
ing companies may be at work. This possibility will be discussed in the
following section.
Meinster and Johnson used portfolio theory to develop a procedure
for quantifying the relationship between bank holding company diversifi-
cation and risk. The theoretical procedure was simulated based on bank
and nonbank data for two bank holding companies. They concluded that
diversification may reduce risk for bank holding companies but cau-
tioned that this result may hold for some companies but not for others.89
A study by Boyd, Hanweck and Pithyachariyakul, criticized other stud-
85. Heggestad, Riskiness of Investments in Nonbank Activities by Bank Holding Compa-
nies, 27 J. ECON. & Bus. 219 (1974).
86. Eisemann, Diversification and the Congeneric Bank Holding Company, 7 J. BANK RE-
SEARCH 68 (1976).
87. Blair & Heggestad, Bank Portfolio Regulation and the Probability of Bank Failure, 10
J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 88 (1978).
88. M. JESSEE & S. SEELIG, BANK HOLDING COMPANIES AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
(1977).
89. Meinster & Johnson, Bank Holding Company Diversification and the Risk of Capital
Impairment, 10 BELL J. ECON. 683 (1979).
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ies for using industry level data to measure risk because by doing so sig-
nificant risk faced by individual firms in an industry may be hidden.
Furthermore, unlike most other studies, they examined the actual experi-
ence of 469 banks or groups of banks with 1,126 nonbank affiliates in
various permissible activities. Their analysis led them to conclude that
the potential for risk reduction by diversification is limited at best and
that the probability of bankruptcy increases beyond only a very small
investment in nonbanking activities.9"
Stover developed a wealth maximization model to estimate the effect
of developing a portfolio of both bank and nonbank firms involving a
subsample from Eisemann's data. His results, based on both industry
and firm data for 1959 through 1968, indicated that diversification by
banking organizations increased their value.9' Herzig-Marx and Drum
used stock price indexes for 1971 through 1978 and some measure of
returns for two groups of banks and eight nonbanking activities. Based
on measures of risk and correlations of nonbanking returns with banking,
it was concluded that diversification into some activities may reduce
bank risk.92
Two recent studies by Eisenbeis, Harris and Lakonishok used evi-
dence from returns to investors as indicators of the benefits of bank di-
versification. The first of these studies attempted to determine whether
shareholders of banks and bank holding companies perceived benefits
from product and geographic diversification. The analysis is based upon
an examination of weekly stock returns for seventy-eight banks during
1968 through 1975 and the effect on stock return of the announcement
that these banks would form one-bank holding companies. Results
showed increased returns in connection with the announcement. This
and other analysis led to the conclusion that the market perceives bene-
fits from diversification, but the benefit of product diversification was per-
ceived as much smaller than geographic diversification. 93 The other
study examined the monthly returns for the bonds of eleven companies
(two of which were banking organizations) that acquired a financial serv-
ices company to determine the effect of the announcement on bondholder
90. Boyd, Hanweck & Pithyachariyakul, Bank Holding Company Diversification, in PRO-
CEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION 105 (May 1980)
(Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago).
91. Stover, A Re-Examination of Bank Holding Company Acquisitions, 13 3. BANK Rn-
SEARCH 101 (1982).
92. C. HERZIG-MARX & D. DRUM, BANK HOLDING COMPANY RISK AND NONBANKING
FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES (1979).
93. R. EISENBEIS, R. HARRIS & J. LAKONISHOK, BENEFITS OF BANK DIVERSIFICATION:
THE EVIDENCE FROM SHAREHOLDER RETURNS (May 1983).
[Vol. 181148
SYMPOSIUM
returns. The analysis revealed no abnormal returns suggesting that
bondholders did not perceive the acquisitions to have a significant effect
on the acquirers' risk.94
In general, studies of the risk implications of product line expansion
by banking organizations have concluded that at least some limited risk
reduction is likely, although sometimes the conclusion was stated very
cautiously. It is notable, however, that the two studies which analyzed
the actual experience of holding companies with product line expansion
reached a different conclusion than studies using indirect evidence along
with pure portfolio theory. In any event, most of these studies have over-
looked two important considerations that cast doubt upon if not invali-
date the results of the other studies. These additional considerations are
pursued below. Although risk reduction may result in some unknown
way in a deregulated environment, it cannot be inferred from these
studies.
2. Problems with the evidence on risk
The studies reviewed above attempted to assess the likely risk effects
of product line expansion by banking organizations. This assessment is
difficult compared with assessing the effects of interstater banking on lo-
cal market and national concentration because the geographic expansion
expected from interstate banking is approximated in a number of states
while in others it is not. This situation provides a basis for comparison
from actual experience. In contrast, studies dealing with the risk impli-
cations of product line expansion in banking do not have access to data
from directly relevant experience because there are no banking organiza-
tions heavily diversified into, for example, securities underwriting, insur-
ance underwriting and real estate development. As a consequence, the
evidence developed by studies of the risk implications of product line
expansion is much less direct and the conclusions less certain than the
evidence and conclusions from studies assessing the effects of interstate
banking on structure and bank performance. Furthermore, the studies
that are elevant to the risk implications of product line expansion gener-
ally overlook two important considerations-the questionable validity of
applying portfolio theory to the investments by a firm and the operating
risk that may result from significant diversification.
94. Wall & Eisenbeis, Risk Consideration in Deregulating Bank Activities, ECON. REv.,
May 1984, at 6 (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta).
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a. the adequacy of portfolio theory
It is appropriate to use various measures of risk from financial the-
ory, based on levels and variations of rates of return, to compare the risk
of banking with various nonbanking activities.95 This involves nothing
more than comparing the risk of banking with that of nonbanking activi-
ties. It is not valid, however, to apply directly the risk reduction poten-
tial of diversification as described in basic portfolio theory to the
situation of product line expansion by banks as several studies have
done.96 Specifically, in analyzing the risk effects of diversification, basic
portfolio theory starts with an investor who is assumed to be risk averse
and a wealth maximizer. The investor then purchases securities to hold
in a portfolio of securities. It can be demonstrated that the investor can
theoretically maximize his return by diversifying his portfolio so that it
reduces the risk of the entire portfolio. Thus, the investor is able to hold
individual securities with relatively high returns and corresponding
higher risk.97
The problem with applying basic portfolio theory to assess the ef-
fects of expansion by bank holding companies is that we are not analyz-
ing an investor purchasing securities for a portfolio. This theoretical
investor is making arms-length transactions and is able to acquire and
dispose of securities almost instantaneously, at little cost and without
concern for the reaction of other investors and market participants to his
transactions. The lack of analogy between this situation, which is the
standard in portfolio theory, and the product line expansion by bank
holding companies (or any other firm for that matter) is striking and
obvious. The essential difference is that when the holding company di-
95. There may even be some problems with this approach if industry level data are relied
upon since the data will reflect overall industry variations rather than individual firm varia-
tions in profitability.
96. Meinster and Johnson were very explicit about the assumption they were making in
applying portfolio theory to diversification by bank holding companies. They noted that the
subsidiary activities were treated as individual "securities" in a holding company "portfolio."
Meinster & Johnson, Bank Holding Company Diversification and the Risk of Capital Impair-
ment, 10 BELL J. ECON. 683 (1979). Other studies also made this very basic assumption but
were not explicit about it. See, e.g., Eisemann, Diversification and the Congeneric Bank Hold-
ing Company, 7 J. BANK RESEARCH 68 (1976); Boyd, Hanweck & Pithyachariyakul, Bank
Holding Company Diversification, in PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE
AND COMPETITION 105 (May 1980) (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago); Blair & Heggestad,
Bank Portfolio Regulation and the Probability of Bank Failure, 10 J. MONEY, CREDIT &
BANIKNG 88 (1978).
97. These basic elements of portfolio selection are typically discussed in terms of an inves-
tor's portfolio of securities. See, eg., W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MAR-
KETs chs. 2, 3 (1970); E. BRIGHAM, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE ch.
5 (3d ed. 1982).
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versifies, it typically does not do so simply by purchasing securities,
which are represented by pieces of paper that are stored in a desk drawer
or safety deposit box until they mature or are sold. Instead, diversifica-
tion by the holding company entails lumpy investments or sales; the in-
vestments or sales are not arms-length in nature because they may have
implications for other operations (and people) of the holding company;
the likely reactions of competitors in the new and/or original product
line must be taken into account; and movement into and out of product
lines often requires considerable time and significant costs. Finally, such
studies typically do not take into account the possibility that even if bank
holding companies could theoretically reduce risk by diversification, they
may adjust the asset holdings and capital of their banks and other subsid-
iaries in a manner that offsets any risk reduction that pure portfolio di-
versification provides.98 Any such adjustments are judgmental and so
the ultimate effect on overall risk of the firm is uncertain, which allows
the possibility of over adjustment and, thus, an overall increase in risk.
Perhaps even more fundamental differences between the nature of
diversification described in traditional portfolio theory and that which is
undertaken by bank holding companies result from (1) the integration of
the holding company's investment into its overall operation and (2) the
objective function of holding company managers. When a holding com-
pany diversifies its product line, it invests in new operations usually in-
volving additional people and production facilities. Whether the
investment is made by way of acquiring an existing firm or de novo, evi-
dence discussed earlier suggests that, generally, some effort will be made
to integrate the operations of the new product line with existing opera-
tions. This is, of course, in marked contrast to the portfolio diversifica-
tion with securities envisioned in portfolio theory and obviously raises
many additional considerations.
With respect to the objective function, a basic assumption of portfo-
lio theory, as previously mentioned, is that the investor is a wealth maxi-
mizer. This assumption may be a reasonable one for individual investors.
But, is it appropriate to apply this same objective function to the man-
ager of a holding company (or other firm)? That is, is it reasonable to
98. Available evidence consistently shows that individual bank and nonbank affiliates of
bank holding companies have less capital and are more risky in terms of asset and/or liability
holdings than independent firms. Studies which have explored the effect of acquisitions on
assets and liabilities have found a change to a more risky position for the individual affiliate.
For a review of these studies, see Curry, The Performance of Bank Holding Companies, and
Rose, The Effect of the Bank Holding Company Movement on Bank Safety and Soundness in
THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY MOVEMENT TO 1978: A COMPENDIUM (Sept. 1978) (Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
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assume that the manager will make investment and other decisions en-
tirely in the stockholders' interest of maximizing the value of the firm?
There is a substantial body of literature which suggests that this assump-
tion is not valid and that the manager, in his or her own best interest, will
have other objectives. Interest in the possibility that managers may have
different objectives than those of owners was stimulated by the classic
work of Berle and Means which showed that a substantial portion of
large United States corporations were manager-controlled rather than
owner-controlled.99 This provided reasons for questioning whether man-
agers would be profit maximizers. Obviously, the income of hired man-
agers is heavily dependent on salaries so that income from profits is not
likely to be as important as it is to owners who rely on profits for in-
come."° For example, Baumol has argued that hired managers have an
incentive to maximize growth of their firms, subject to a profit con-
straint. l0 1 The rationale is that there is a direct relationship between firm
size and executive salaries. There is some evidence to support this posi-
tion. I0" It has also been argued that managers may prefer to incur sub-
stantial expenses in order to make their job more attractive, instead of
minimizing expenses in order to maximize profits.10 3 The desire for
power through control over resources, people and events has recently
been proposed, along with some evidence, as the primary motivator of
business executives."° In short, it should be clear that there is a reason-
able foundation for questioning the assumption that maximization of
profit or the value of the firm is the sole or even primary objective of
managers. This, of course, raises further questions regarding the validity
99. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932). An update of that study showed that this pattern of control became even more pro-
nounced over time. See Lamer, Ownership and Control in the 200 Largest Nonfinancial Corpo-
rations, 1929 and 1963, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1966).
100. Studies focusing on the form of executive compensation and its effect on firm profit
performance have obtained mixed results. See, e.g., Gordon, Ownership and Compensation as
Incentive to Corporation Executives, 54 Q.L ECON. 455 (1940); Lewellen, Management and
Ownership in the Large Firm, 24 J. FIN. 299 (1969); Masson, Executive Motivations, Earnings,
and Consequent Equity Performance, 79 J. POL. ECON. 1278 (1971).
101. W. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE, AND GROWTH (1959).
102. See, e.g., D. ROBERTS, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (1959); McGuire, Chiu & Elbr-
ing, Executive Income, Sales and Profits, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 753 (1962); Patton, Top Execu-
tive Pay: New Facts and Figures, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1966, at 94; Cubbin & Hall,
Directors Remuneration in the Theory of the Firm, 20 EUR. ECON. REV. 333 (1983).
103. This position has been developed by Williamson, Managerial Discretion and Business
Behavior, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 1032 (1963); Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency v. "X.Efficiency",
56 AM. ECON. REV. 392 (1966).
104. S. RHOADES, POWER, EMPIRE BUILDING, AND MERGERS (1983).
[Vol. 181152
SYMPOSIUM
of applying portfolio theory to the diversification of bank holding
companies.
Overall, it appears that it is not valid to use standard portfolio the-
ory to assess the risk implications of product line expansion by banking
organizations. The theory simply does not fit.
b. operating risk- an overlooked factor
It is evident that studies dealing directly or indirectly with the risk
implications of product line expansion by banks focus almost exclusively
on "financial risk." Financial risk means the risk resulting strictly from
the investment transaction and from the risk characteristics of the activ-
ity entered, as through it were a security. There is, however, another
important element of risk that is generally overlooked by these studies; it
may be referred to as "operating risk." Operating risk is the risk that
managers of a given operation will do a relatively poor job. The potential
for doing so increases as the size and range of operations of the firm
increases. Perhaps the reason why operating risk has been ignored in
favor of financial risk is primarily because portfolio theory provides a
net, clean systematic framework for analyzing financial risk. No such
framework is available for analyzing operating risk. In any event, the
analyses of financial risk tell only part of the risk story. It is necessary to
examine the possible effects of product line expansion on operating risk
to obtain a more complete assessment of the risk effects of expansion.
Unfortunately, in addition to the fact that there is no neat theoreti-
cal framework for analyzing operating risk, there is not systematic re-
search that is directly relevant to the operating risk associated with
product line expansion (diversification) by banking organizations. There
is, however, some very limited evidence concerning past expansion by
bank holding companies and some general evidence from product line
expansion and mergers in the industrial sector.
The 1970 amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act gave the
Federal Reserve Board the authority to determine which nonbanking ac-
tivities bank holding companies could enter subject to the constraints
that the activities be "closely related to banking" and "a proper incident
thereto."1 5 Since then, the Federal Reserve Board has approved a
number of activities either by order or regulation. Three of the most
popular ventures have been mortgage banking, consumer finance and
105. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
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leasing.1°6 Much of the entry by bank holding companies have been ac-
complished by acquisition rather than de novo. Studies have been con-
ducted to compare the operating performance of the bank holding
company subsidiaries with their independent counterparts in each of
these activities. These studies have found, without exception, that bank
holding company subsidiaries in mortgage banking, consumer finance
and leasing exhibited poorer operating performance than did independ-
ent firms in the same activities.107 Another study examined the experi-
ence of banks in real estate investment trusts (REITs) in the early
1970's. I08 Based on a study of eighty-five REITs, Schotland found that
the performance record of bank-sponsored REITs was considerably
worse than average, and that one reason was weak management as a re-
sult of the rapid growth of REITs. Various measures of performance
were used in these studies including profitability, capitalization and
growth. These studies were all subject to one or more shortcomings such
as a limited sample and data limitations. Furthermore, it is conceivable
that the relatively low profits of holding company subsidiaries reflected a
transfer of funds to the parent holding company in the form of dividends
or management fees. Nevertheless, the consistency of the findings is no-
table and raises the possibility that there are operating risks associated
with product line expansion. That is, a very large banking organization
may face some problems in effectively managing newly acquired activi-
ties, at least in the early years.
Experience in the industrial sector suggests that, for at least some
firms, there are significant risks associated with diversification. Although
such experience is not from the financial sector, much less banking, and
is fifteen to twenty years old, it provides a basis for questioning the pro-
priety of bank diversification. During the 1960's a number of large in-
106. The nonbank offices of bank holding companies can be established on an interstate
basis.
107. Rhoades, The Effect of Bank-Holding-Company Acquisitions of Mortgage Bankers on
Mortgage Lending Activity, 48 J. Bus. 344 (1975); Talley, Bank Holding Company Performance
in Consumer Finance and Mortgage Banking, MAG. BANK ADMIN., July 1976, at 42; S.
RHOADES & G. BOCZAR, THE PERFORMANCE OF BANK HOLDING COMPANY-AFFILIATED
FINANCE COMPANIES, Staff Economic Studies No. 90 (1977) (Federal Reserve Board) summa-
rized in 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 715 (1977); Rhoades, The Performance of Bank Holding Companies
in Equipment Leasing, J. COM. BANK LENDING, Oct. 1980, at 53. One recent study found that
mortgage banking affiliates of bank holding companies do not provide funds to the mortgage
market on a countercyelical basis as compared to independents. See Burke & Rhoades, Bank
Holding Company Affiliation and Contracyclical Lending by Mortgage Bankers, 36 J. ECON. &
Bus. 275 (1984).
108. PETER MERRILL ASSOCIATES, INC., THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF BANK
EQUITY INVESTMENT IN REAL ESTATE app. A (March 1984) (prepared for the American
Bankers Association).
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dustrial firms pursued a strategy of product line expansion to a point
where the managers could no longer effectively manage the operations.
These firms include such well-known names as Gulf and Western, Litton
Industries, LTV, Tenneco, International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT)
and Textron. These and many other companies enjoyed tremendous
growth, usually by acquisition, with the full backing of the financial ex-
perts on Wall Street. By the late 1960's, however, it became apparent
that the "synergy" that was supposed to result from product line expan-
sion was more of a sales catchword than a description of the real
world.109 Skepticism about management's ability to effectively manage
diversified firms began to appear in the business press. For example, Gil-
bert Burck writing in Fortune noted:
[T]he headquarters managements of such companies also have
one immense problem in common; theirs is a vastly harder and
more complex job than managing a homogeneous or single-
market company. Top multi-market management is responsi-
ble for the whole firm; it justifies its existence only if the divi-
sions perform better or more efficiently as divisions than they
could as independent companies. But a multi-market company
is also by definition a mult-adversity company. As the trials
and tribulations of corporate history testify abundantly, a sin-
gle-market company, even in good times, runs into troubles
that can strain if not floor the most gifted managers. Because a
corporation composed of a lot of different divisions can encoun-
ter more adversities than the more homogeneous company, it
may need more top-level management talent to deal with
them. 110
As skepticism spread about the operating effectiveness of large di-
versified firms, the stock market drubbed the stocks of many of these
firms. Thus, in 1969, LTV tumbled from $97 to $26, Gulf and Western
slid from $50 to $18, Avco declined from $49 to $23 and Textron fell
from $45 to $23. Another indication of the unfortunate operating results
of much of the product line expansion is the substantial increase in spi-
noffs of operating units during the 1970's. Often these units had been
previously acquired but failed to perform well after acquisition. In con-
nection with this spin-off activity, Arthur Burck, a merger consultant for
the past twenty-five years, observed:
109. For a much more detailed account of the experience of the industrial conglomerates
and the implications of the conglomerate merger movement, see S. RHOADES, POWER, EM-
PIRE BUILDING, AND MERGERS chs. 11, 12 (1983).
110. Burck, The Perils of the Multi-Market Corporation, FORTUNE, Feb. 1967, at 131.
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Takeovers by the corporate giants have damaged a great
many companies. The acquisitions have weakened or destroyed
countless thousands of small and medium-sized businesses that
were star performers when they were independent.
Look at the wave of diversitures. In the past 15 years,
there have been thousands of divestitures of acquired compa-
nies. The buyer realizes that he simply got stuck. From my
own experience, I would say that perhaps 95 percent of the
merger proposals that are explored never materialize, and
among the 5 percent that do go through a high percentage, per-
haps seven out of ten, are so-so or bad deals.11'
The available evidence regarding product line expansions in the in-
dustrial sector suggests that there apparently are operating risks arising
from product line expansion, at least for some firms. This experience, of
course, is not from the banking industry or the financial sector. How-
ever, if the poor operating performance arising from product line expan-
sion is attributable in part to the increased difficulty managers face in
effectively managing a firm as it becomes larger and more diversified, the
experience is relevant to product line expansion in banking.
Other indications of the existence of operating risk from product
line expansion emerge from empirical studies of conglomerate mergers
and the problem of allocating overhead costs. Surveys of much of the
research on the effects of conglomerate mergers have been made by
Steiner and Mueller. On the basis of his review of the evidence, Steiner
concluded that (1) the acquired firms were roughly average in their re-
spective industries in terms of size and profitability (profits were a little
low); (2) the acquiring firms displayed no systematic characteristics; and
(3) there was no systematic evidence to support the possible motivations
for the acquisitions such as real efficiency, monopoly gains, growth or
speculation." 2 The survey by Mueller reached a similar conclusion.
Mueller noted:
True, the a priori theories of mergers' causes and effects are still
in conflict, and will probably always remain so. But the empiri-
cal literature, upon which this survey focuses, draws a surpris-
ingly consistent picture. Whatever the stated or unstated goals
of managers are, the mergers they have consummated have on
average not generated extra profits for the acquiring firms,
111. FORTUNE,(Oct. 19, 1981, at 221 (interview of Arthur Burck by Edward Meadows).
112. P. STEINER, MERGERS (1975).
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Such conclusions seem to be quite general as studies of merger activ-
ity in foreign countries yield similar conclusions. For example, a study of
merger activity in the United Kingdom by Meeks (which was not limited
to conglomerates) covering much of the postwar era concluded:
Firstly, there appear to be financial (and other) incentives to
managers who have little or no ownership interest in the com-
pany to pursue growth even at the expense of profitability ...
Second, the efficiency gains, which in public policy statements
have been assumed to be the saving grace of growth by take-
over, cannot in the event be relied upon: strong evidence was
reported that the efficiency of the typical amalgamation did not
improve after merger ...- it actually appears to have
declined.
114
In addition to the apparent difficulty of successfully integrating an
acquired firm, there is reason to consider the extent to which operating
risk is increased as the problem in allocating overhead costs increases.
The allocation of overhead costs by a firm can conceptually be a difficult
problem, as outlined by Clark." 5 It is also a very difficult problem in
practice as suggested by discussions of the issue in most intermediate
textbooks in business and finance. Because of the inherent inaccuracy
associated with allocating costs of operation among different product
lines, the business manager cannot accurately determine efficiency
problems and profitability of the various activities. It seems reasonable
that the allocation problem becomes more difficult as the range of a
firm's activities increase. Thus, it follows that if the problem of allocat-
ing overhead costs raises operating risk, that risk will increase with prod-
uct line expansion.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The merits of interstate banking and product line expansion are be-
ing actively discussed in policy circles. Arguments both for and against
interstate banking and product line expansion have been articulated by
vested interest groups and those with strong ideological positions. Policy
decisions made on these issues will have profound implications for the
113. Mueller, The Effects of Conglomerate Mergers, 1 J. BANKING & FIN. 315, 344 (1977).
114, G. MEEKS, DISAPPOINTING MARRIAGE: A STUDY OF THE GAINS FROM MERGER 66
(1977). Dennis Mueller obtained similar results in his recent study of merger activity in seven
countries. See THE DETERMINANTS AND EFFECTS OF MERGERS: AN INTERNATIONAL COM-
PARISON (D. Mueller ed. 1980).
115. J. CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS (1923).
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structure of the banking system and the financial structure generally, as
well as the safety and soundness of the banking system. Consequently, it
is important that the public interest prevail over vested interest groups
and ideological views. This result is best ensured if policy decisions are
based on relevant evidence rather than on the views or beliefs of particu-
lar groups. The conclusions of this article are based largely on a review
of the evidence on many of the issues raised by interstate banking and
product line deregulation.
The prospect of interstate banking has raised questions about the
implications for local market banking concentration, nationwide banking
concentration, the viability of small banks and the allocation of credit in
the economy. Fortunately, there is considerable evidence that is directly
relevant to most of these questions. The evidence from individual states
indicates that interstate banking would not have a significant effect on
concentration or competition within local banking markets. Even
though increased competition is not likely to result from changes in mar-
ket structure, removal of barriers to geographic expansion should in-
crease the threat of entry, which should result in more competitive
pricing according to the theory of potential competition. This assumes
that the antitrust laws would be adequately enforced.
With respect to nationwide banking concentration, evidence from
state level experience suggests that concentration would increase substan-
tially under interstate banking. Furthermore, existing antitrust laws
would not significantly limit the increase. There are, however, various
methods to constrain the extent of the increase in nationwide banking
concentration. These methods are relatively simple and straightforward,
and therefore, could be incorporated into legislation permitting interstate
banking. Before any legislative proposal would be feasible, it is necessary
for such constraints to be incorporated, although neither theory nor evi-
dence indicate the level at which constraints should be set.
Regarding the viability of small banks in an era of interstate bank-
ing, available evidence -consistently indicates that many small banks
should be able to survive and prosper. In particular, large banks do not
have significant efficiency advantages over smaller banks, small banks on
average exhibit superior growth and financial performance in comparison
to banks owned by larger organizations (even when located in the same
market) and small banks have been able to adapt to and use new applica-
tions of electronic technology. This would seem to rule out the possibil-
ity of massive small-bank failures which otherwise might be a significant
and serious externality from interstate banking.
In contrast to some of the other questions raised by the prospect of
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interstate banking, there is virtually no direct evidence on the credit allo-
cation effects of interstate banking. It appears, however, that because the
marketplace has developed such efficient mechanisms of credit alloca-
tion, interstate banking would probably not yield significant improve-
ments. Nevertheless, we do not know what allocative efficiency gains
might emerge from nationwide banking, and it is possible that there
could be unforseen gains with little likelihood of losses in this area.
While gains in allocative efficiency are uncertain, short-run cost efficiency
gains may be realized. Specifically, electronic funds transfer will proba-
bly develop faster within the firm than in the open marketplace because
of consumers' slow pace of acceptance of this technology. This would
yield more efficient funds transfer but only until the marketplace and
consumers accept and utilize the electronic technology.
In sum, while there is no clear evidence that interstate banking
would yield significant public benefits, there is no indication that it would
have significant adverse effects. In view of the evidence, two fundamen-
tal considerations suggest interstate banking would be in the public inter-
est. First, microeconomic theory indicates that freely functioning
markets will generally yield the most efficient allocation of resources, as-
suming that adverse externalities and market failures are not generated
by the marketplace. This provides an economic presumption in favor of
removing regulatory restrictions, unless adverse effects are likely or very
serious. Second, in a country founded on the principle of private prop-
erty, there should be a compelling justification for restricting the free use
of private property. No such justification is apparent in connection with
interstate banking.
The implications of product line expansion are decidedly more prob-
lematic than those raised by interstate banking because it is debatable
whether banks are special enough to warrant regulation and are effec-
tively insulated from the financial fortunes of their holding company par-
ents and affiliates. Additionally, there is little direct evidence on the
possible effects of product line expansion. This article concludes that
banks are special and critical to the economic system. It also concludes
that regardless of the effectiveness of the legal doctrine of corporate sepa-
rateness, the perceptions of bank holding company managers, investors
and depositors suggest that the financial fortunes of a bank will be di-
rectly affected by the financial fortunes of other units of the holding com-
pany. Having reached these conclusions, it makes sense to examine the
implications of product line expansion, especially with respect to bank
risk.
Product line expansion for banks raises questions about the implica-
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tions for tie-in arrangements, conflicts of interest, undue concentration of
financial resources, efficiency and risk. All of these questions are impor-
tant. Since, however, risk, unlike the other questions, is not clearly man-
ageable and is critical to the safety and soundness of the banking system,
this Article focuses upon the risk question.
Most studies dealing with the risk effects of product line expansion
use indirect evidence not based on actual experience of banking organiza-
tions. Such studies use portfolio theory to draw inferences as to the risk
effect. Generally, these studies suggest that product line expansion
would reduce or at least not increase bank risk. This Article, however,
contends that the straightforward application of portfolio theory in those
studies is inappropriate. Consequently, no conclusions can be drawn on
the basis of this evidence. It is also noted that all of the studies dealing
with the risk of product line expansion focus strictly on financial risk and
overlook another potentially important dimension of risk-operating
risk. While there is no neat theoretical framework for addressing operat-
ing risk as there is for financial risk, operating risk should not be ignored.
Indeed, some very limited evidence in banking and recent historical expe-
rience in the industrial sector suggest that, at least for some firms, operat-
ing risk may be substantial. In short, there is little useful research
evidence for assessing the risk effects of product line expansion. Yet,
recent experience suggests that operating risk may be increased, at least
for some firms. For these reasons and because of the serious and far-
reaching externalities that may stem from product line expansion, policy-
makers are faced with very important policy decisions which are both
difficult and judgmental.
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Appendix A
Average Market Concentration Ratios by States as
of June 30, 19821
Statewide
Branching States
Rhode Island
Maine
Idaho
Nevada
Arizona
South Dakota
Massachusetts
Hawaii
Connecticut
North Carolina
Vermont
Oregon
Washington
New Hampshire
District of Columbia
Virginia
California
Maryland
Delaware
New York
South Carolina
Alaska
Utah
New Jersey
Florida
(Average)
Limited Branching
States: MBHCs>50%
Average CR3 for
SMSAs in State?
91.8
91.5
87.7
86.2
85.1
83.8
83.1
78.9
77.5
75.2
74.1
72.4
72.2
71.8
71.2
69.1
68.3
67.9
67.4
65.6
64.6
62.5
57.9
54.7
53.6
(73.4)
Average CR3 for
Non-SMSA Counties
in State
93.3
88.1
95.2
98.6
94.3
94.3
87.4
89.7
81.9
92.3
83.7
90.8
90.0
74.9
N/A
94.2
89.5
83.4
59.5
80.4
91.8
98.3
95.0
63.1
93.8
(87.7)
New Mexico
Georgia
Michigan
Ohio
Alabama
85.2
78.3
75.9
71.4
70.1
96.8
96.8
90.3
84.5
87.0
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Minnesota 66.5 74.7
Wisconsin 62.3 74.8
(Average) (72.8) (86.4)
Limited Branching
States: MBHCs<50%
Mississippi 80.6 95.7
Nebraska 78.9 86.1
Kentucky 75.9 96.8
Arkansas 73.7 93.6
Indiana 72.0 89.3
Louisiana 71.0 90.9
Tennessee 69.1 91.9
Iowa 69.0 75.5
Pennsylvania 65.0 79.7
West Virginia 59.3 91.0
Oklahoma 56.3 84.9
(Average) (70.1) (88.7)
Unit Banking
States: MBHCs>50%
Wyoming 85.9 93.0
Montana 84.5 96.5
Texas 65.2 94.1
Colorado 64.2 95.7
Missouri 59.9 87.0
(Average) (71.9) (93.3)
Unit Banking
States: MBHCs < 50%
North Dakota 72.1 94.8
Kansas 48.6 83.8
Illinois 47.3 74.9
(Average) (56.0) (84.5)
1. Source: Summary of Deposits, June 30, 1982.
2. SMSAs in more than one state were split along state boundaries, and a separate
concentration ratio was calculated for each.
N/A-not applicable.
1162 [Vol. IS
SYMPOSIUM
Appendix B
Statewide Bank Concentration Ratios as of December 31,
19831
Statewide
Branching States
Rhode Island
Nevada
Arizona
Hawaii
District of Columbia
Idaho
Maine
Oregon
Utah
Washington
Connecticut
California
South Carolina
Alaska
North Carolina
Massachusetts
Vermont
Maryland
Delaware
South Dakota
Virginia
New York
New Hampshire
Florida
New Jersey
(Average)
Limited Branching
States: MBHCs>50%
Percent of State
Deposits Held by Top
Five Organizations
2
95.3
94.1
92.1
91.2
87.6
85.5
82.8
82.7
76.1
74.7
73.2
71.6
71.0
70.7
69.5
66.9
65.9
65.8
65.3
63.0
62.9
57.9
52.6
47.3
44.6
(72.4)
Alabama
Georgia
Michigan
Minnesota
New Mexico
58.1
52.8
54.8
56.2
55.7
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Ohio 46.1
Tennessee 50.7
Wisconsin 33.6
(Average) (51.0)
Limited Branching
States: MBHCs<50%
Pennsylvania 39.5
Mississippi 35.3
Kentucky 29.2
Iowa 27.5
Nebraska 24.5
Oklahoma 23.9
Louisiana 21.3
Indiana 21.0
Arkansas 20.8
West Virginia 14.9
(Average) (25.8)
Unit Banking
States: MBHCs > 50%
Colorado 57.1
Montana 52.8
Wyoming 49.0
Missouri 43.9
Texas 42.3
(Average) (49.0)
Unit Banking
States: MBHCs < 50%
North Dakota 43.6
Illinois 37.6
Kansas 13.5
(Average) (31.6)
1. Source: Consolidated Report of Condition and Income, December 31, 1983.
2. Ranked by domestic deposits only.
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